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THE SUPREME COURT, THE DEFENSE
ATTORNEY, AND THE GUILTY PLEA*
ALBERT

W.

ALSCHULER**

On May 4, 1970, the Supreme Court rejected challenges to
guilty-plea convictions in three cases-McMann v. Richardson,'
Parker v. North Carolina,' and Brady v. United States'-and in
each case the Court emphasized that the defendant had been represented by counsel at the time that he decided to plead guilty. The
cases presented two basic issues-first, the validity of a guilty plea
induced by the prospect that a coerced confession would be used at
trial and, second, the validity of a guilty plea induced by the prospect
that an unconstitutional death penalty would be imposed following a
trial.' Although the Court never made the proposition explicit, it
apparently concluded that a competently counseled guilty plea could
be presumed to be knowing and voluntary. Accordingly, the critical
issue in each case was the effectiveness of the legal representation that
the defendant had received.'
* This Article is part of a long-term study of plea negotiation that I am conducting under
the auspices of the University of Chicago's Center for Studies in Criminal Justice. I am
particularly grateful to Dean Norval Morris and Professor Frank Zimring of the Center for
their encouragement and guidance. I am also grateful to Professors Jerold H. Israel and
Richard 0. Lempert of the University of Michigan Law School for careful readings of the
-manuscript and to the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice of the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration, which supported the writing phase of the project
through its Pilot Grant Program. Grant NI 71-116-PG, authorized by the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§3711-95 (1970). Of course the opinions and
conclusions that I express herein are not necessarily shared by any of these individuals or
organizations.
** Visiting Fellow, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Professor of Law, The University of Texas (on leave).
I. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
2. 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
3. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
4. The confession issue was presented by McMann and the death penalty issue by Brady.
Parker, the remaining case of the trilogy, combined the two issues: The defendant alleged that
his guilty plea had been motivated both by an involuntary confession and by an unconstitutional
statute that authorized capital punishment only if a defendant stood trial. The Supreme Court
discussed the confession issue in McMann and Parker and the death-penalty issue in Brady;
the Brady discussion made it unnecessary to address the capital-punishment issue in Parker.
5. Although the view that a competently counseled guilty plea can be presumed a voluntary plea was merely implicit in the Court's analysis, the Court clearly expressed the equation
between a competently counseled plea and a knowing plea. 397 U.S. at 770-71, 774, 797-98.
Three years after the guilty-plea trilogy, moreover, the Court wrote in Tollett v. Henderson,
411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973):
When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact
guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he . . . may only attack the voluntary
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I have argued elsewhere that the Court's opinions, all of which
were authored by Mr. Justice White, reflected an unduly optimistic
view of the quality of advice that defense attorneys customarily provide in the plea-negotiation process. This article explores the Court's
legal craftsmanship, its apparent objectives, and the soundness of its
ultimate equation of the requirement that a guilty plea be entered
knowingly and voluntarily with the requirement that a defendant
receive the effective assistance of counsel. I conclude that the Court
has abandoned desirable concepts of waiver in guilty-plea cases and
has given unjustified weight to the presence of counsel. The Court's
manifest reluctance to upset the institution of plea bargaining has led
it into disingenuous analysis that is inconsistent with its usual approach to problems of waiver.
I.

McMann v. Richardson, SOME

RELATED CASES, AND THE

REQUIREMENT OF A KNOWING WAIVER

A.

The Court's Opinion
McMann v. Richardson7 presented three separate cases, in each
of which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
had ordered an evidentiary hearing on a federal habeas corpus petition. Each of the defendants had sought relief from a New York state
conviction and alleged that his guilty plea had been induced by the
threat that an unconstitutionally obtained confession would be used
against him at trial. The New York procedure in effect at the time
of the defendants' convictions permitted even an involuntary confession to come before the jury. The jtvry was merely instructed to
disregard this evidence if it found that the confession had been
improperly obtained. The guilty pleas were entered prior to Jackson
v. Denno,l in which the Supreme Court ruled this New York procedure unconstitutional and the Jackson decision was applied retroactively to afford relief to defendants who had been convicted at trial
under the unconstitutional procedure."0
and intelligent character of the plea by showing that the advice he received from
counsel was not within the [range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases].
6. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975).
7. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
8. A trial judge in New York could keep a confession from the jury if he found it
involuntary as a matter of law, but the judge could not make such a finding if critical facts
were in dispute or if differing inferences could be drawn from undisputed facts.
9. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
10. Jackson was itself a federal habeas corpus proceeding, and in that sense the decision
was retroactive from its inception. Although the Court did not expressly consider the question
of retroactivity in Jackson, a number of Supreme Court opinions prior to McMann confirmed
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The defendants in McMann alleged that the New York
procedure, by precluding fair hearings on the voluntariness of their
confessions, had influenced their decisions to plead guilty. The defendants claimed that they were as much the victims of this
unconstitutional procedure as defendants who had stood trial and
therefore asked that their guilty pleas be set aside.
The Supreme Court's analysis of this situation was involved and
elaborate. The Court assumed that the defendants had confessed
involuntarily and would not have pleaded guilty had they not confessed. In the Court's words, "We are dealing with a defendant who
deems his confession crucial to the State's case against him and who
would go to trial if he thought his chances of acquittal were good
....
"" Without referring specifically to New York's pre-Jackson
v. Denno procedures, the Court considered whether an involuntary
confession which "trigger[s]" a plea of guilty should render the plea
invalid.
The Court observed that although the defendants' confessions
may have been involuntary, the defendants themselves probably had
proceeded on a different hypothesis:
For the defendant who considers his confession involuntary
and hence unusable against him at a trial, tendering a plea of
guilty would seem a most improbable alternative ....
A more credible explanation for a plea of guilty by a
defendant who would go to trial except for his prior confession is his prediction that the law will permit his admissions
to be used against him by the trier of fact. At least the probability of the State's being permitted to use the confession as
evidence is sufficient to convince him that the State's case is
too strong to contest and that a plea of guilty is the most
advantageous course."1
As the Court saw it, a defendant who had pleaded guilty because his
confession might be used at trial could claim no more than that he
and his counsel had mistakenly assessed the admissibility of the confession. 3 The Court concluded that a competently counseled
defendant could fairly be required to endure the consequences of this
mistake:
that Jackson was to be retroactively applied. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 72729 (1966); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618, 639 n.20 (1965).
II. 397 U.S. at 768.
12. Id. at 768-69.
13. Id. at 769.
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In the face of unavoidable uncertainty, the defendant and his
counsel must make their best judgment as to the weight of the
State's case. Counsel must predict how the facts, as he understands them, would be viewed by a court. . . .Questions like
these cannot be answered with certitude; yet a decision to
plead guilty must necessarily rest upon counsel's answers,
uncertain as they may be. . . .In our view a defendant's plea
of guilty based on reasonably competent advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the ground that counsel may
have misjudged the admissibility of the defendant's confession. 4
The Supreme Court then recognized that this analysis did not
fully resolve the problem in McMann. Under the procedure in effect
at the time of the defendants' pleas, a competent attorney would not
have regarded a defendant's confession as "unusable against him at
trial" simply because the confession was involuntary. The New York
courts did, in effect, permit involuntary confessions to be used at
trial. Jackson v. Denno had held the state's evidentiary procedures
unconstitutional for that very reason. In the Supreme Court's view,
however, New York's unconstitutional procedures were only another
factor for the defendant and his lawyer to consider in choosing an
advantageous plea. Although a defendant who had decided to stand
trial would now be entitled to the benefit of the Supreme Court's
decision in Jackson, "[it is no denigration of the right to trial to hold
that when the defendant . . . admits his guilt, he does so under the
law then existing."'" The Court concluded:
For the respondents successfully to claim relief based on
Jackson v. Denno, each must demonstrate gross error on the
part of counsel when he recommended that the defendant
plead guilty instead of going to trial . . . . Such showing
cannot be made, for [various courts including the Supreme
Court had upheld the New York procedure at the time of the
defendants' pleas].'"
B. A Problem of Craftsmanship: Was the McMann Opinion
Directed to the Cases Before the Court?
In the main, the Supreme Court seemed to address a hypothetical case very different from any of the cases before it. In all three
cases, the issue was whether the defendants had alleged sufficient
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 769-70.
Id. at 774.
Id. at 772-73.
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facts in their habeas corpus petitions to entitle them to evidentiary
hearings and, if so, on what issues. Largely ignoring the allegations
of the defendants' petitions, however, the Court proceeded from the
simple and indisputable fact that the defendants had pleaded guilty.
If the defendants had pleaded guilty for reasons independent of the
threat to use their confessions at trial, this threat could offer no basis
for relief. If, however, the threat to use the confessions had induced
the defendants' pleas, the defendants must have thought that the
confessions would be admissible or at least that the chance of their
use was sufficient to make a bargained plea seem advantageous. At
most, therefore, the defendants could claim that they had been mistaken in their assessment of the admissibility of the confessions.
Even as a theoretical matter, this canvassing of the various possibilities was less than exhaustive. Mr. Justice White's opinion painted
a picture of deliberate strategic decision-making: A defense attorney
had assessed at least cursorily the chances that a defendant's confession might be received in evidence; he had advised the defendant of
these chances; and the defendant, acting on the basis of the lawyer's
possibly mistaken advice, had decided to waive his right to challenge
the confession's admissibility. This analysis disregarded the sort of
case in which a defendant has not considered the issue at all-in
which he has assumed without reflection that any confession would
insure his conviction and in which his attorney has done nothing to
disabuse him of this error. In terms of traditional concepts of waiver,
the difference between this second kind of case and the kind that the
Supreme Court considered is clear. In the kind of case the Court
considered, a defendant has deliberately compromised a disputed
legal issue-the voluntariness of his confession. He has knowingly, if
perhaps unadvisedly, sacrificed his legal rights to gain the advantages
of a plea agreement." In the second sort of case, a defendant unaware
of any realistic chance of challenging the admissibility of his confession has not knowingly sacrificed this right to gain some advantage.
The Court's analysis therefore seems inapplicable to his situation.
Although the Supreme Court did not expressly foreclose the
possibility that a defendant in this second sort of case might secure
relief on the ground that he had been denied the effective assistance
of counsel, the Court implied that this relief would not be available.
17. Of course the defendant's knowledge even in this situation is less than perfect. He
does not know whether the trial court would ultimately hold his confession voluntary or involuntary. Nevertheless, he might know the situation as well as anyone could know it in advance
of litigation, and his case therefore seems very different from that of a defendant who does not
realize that the law excludes involuntary confessions from evidence or that his own confession
might qualify.
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Thus, although the Court recognized that "gross" misadvice might
establish a denial of the constitutional right to counsel, it did not
suggest that an attorney's failure to advise the defendant of the possible invalidity of his confession would make a guilty plea invalid.
Moreover, after asserting that it was necessary for each of the
defendants to show "gross error on the part of counsel," the Court
added flatly, "Such showing cannot be made ... ."I' The reason for
this conclusion was the Court's view that, under its decisions, the
defense attorneys might reasonably have foregone their claims that
the defendants' confessions were inadmissible. Whether the attorneys
had actually made this "reasonable judgment" and whether the defendants had knowingly waived their rights were apparently irrelevant to the Court's analysis.'
The habeas corpus petitions in McMann revealed that all of the
cases before the Court belonged in the category that it ignored rather
than the category that it considered. The petitions not only left open
the possibility that the defendants had pleaded guilty in ignorance of
their rights, they expressly contradicted the Court's picture of strategic consultation between the defendants and their attorneys. Each
defendant set forth specific facts designed to show that his attorney
had not adequately advised him. The advice that the first defendant
had allegedly received from his attorney was simply that the defendant did not "stand a chance due to the alleged confession." 0 On its
face, this advice seemed to suggest that even an involuntary confession would automatically insure the defendant's conviction, something that was not true even under the unconstitutional New York
procedure. The second defendant maintained that his attorney had
conferred with him for only ten minutes prior to his plea of guilty.
The attorney had reportedly said that "this was not the proper time
to bring up the confession" and that the defendant "could later explain by a writ of habeas corpus how my confession had been beaten
out of me."'" In the third case, the defendant claimed that his attorney, since disbarred, had falsely assured him that his guilty plea
would be to a misdemeanor.
18. 397 US. at 772.
19. Of course, a defendant should be given the opportunity to exercise his constitutional
rights even when it would be "reasonable" for him not to do so.
20. 397 U.S. at 762.
21. Id. at 763.
22. Id. at 764. It is also worth noting that the habeas corpus petitions did not allege subtle
coercive influences that might have made the voluntariness of the defendants' confessions
problematic and thereby called for a delicate legal evaluation. The first defendant claimed that
he had been beaten, refused counsel, and threatened with false charges unless he agreed to
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In the concluding sentences of its McMann opinion, the Supreme Court indicated that the last two defendants might be entitled
to hearings to determine whether they had been denied the effective
assistance of counsel. At least the Court would not "now express

disagreement" with the Second Circuit's ruling that these defendants
should be granted hearings on the issue. The allegations of the habeas
corpus petitions would, I think, establish a denial of the right to
counsel in these last two cases, and might establish a similar denial
in the first case as well.1 3 At the same time, these allegations would,
even under the Court's analysis, establish that the defendants had not
intelligently waived the right to challenge the validity of their confessions. For that reason, the Supreme Court's discussion of various
hypothetical states of mind that might lead to pleas of guilty seemed
irrelevant to the cases before the Court. Even on the Court's assumptions, the defendants should have been granted the hearings that they

sought on the grounds that they advanced: Under the circumstances
of the cases as alleged in the petitions, the defendants' involuntary

confessions had indeed rendered their guilty pleas invalid. The defendants complained, not that they and their lawyers had made a mistaken strategic judgment, but that they had not knowingly sacrificed
or compromised their rights in any way.
Of course it is appropriate for a reviewing court to address itself
to the principles of decision that the court below employed, and it was
on this basis that the Supreme Court seemed to justify its intricate
analysis in McMann. The Court asserted, "It was the Court of Appeals' view that a plea of guilty . . . is not voluntary if it is the
consequence of an involuntary confession," 4 and most of the Court's
confess. The second defendant also alleged that his confession had been obtained by beating.
The third defendant reported that he had been handcuffed to a desk, threatened with a pistol,
and physically abused prior to his confession. 397 U.S. at 762-64.
23. The Court indicated that the defendant in this first case might be entitled to a hearing
on his claim that the trial judge had threatened to impose the maximum sentence if he were
convicted following a plea of not guilty. The Court did not, however, discuss whether the
allegations of the habeas corpus petition might establish a denial of the right to counsel-whether, in other words, the petition might meet the standards set forth in the McMann
opinion. See 397 U.S. at 765-66, 774-75.
24. Id. at 764-65. The Court also said:
The core of the Court of Appeals' holding is the proposition that if in a collateral
proceeding a guilty plea is shown to have been triggered by a coerced confession-if
there would have been no plea had there been no confession-the plea is vulnerable
at least in cases coming from New York where the guilty plea was taken prior to
Jackson v. Denno . . ..
Id. at 766. With this qualification that the Court added at the end of this sentence, its description of the Second Circuit's position was accurate, see United States ex rel. Ross v. McMann,
409 F.2d 1016, 1023 (2d Cir. 1969), but the Court proceeded for most of its opinion to discuss
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opinion was devoted to a refutation of this proposition.
Nevertheless, one looks in vain through the Second Circuit's
opinions for any expression of the position that the Supreme Court
attributed to it. The Second Circuit's most authoritative pronouncement on the issue was its en banc ruling in United States ex rel. Ross
v. McMann,25 one of the cases that came before the Supreme Court
in McMann v. Richardson. A federal district court had refused to
consider the possible involuntariness of the defendant's confession on
the theory that a guilty plea waives all prior nonjurisdictional defects
in the proceedings. The Second Circuit replied that a guilty plea has
this effect only when the plea is voluntary, and "[tihe problem is that
[certain appellate cases are] being read by the District Courts to say
that a coerced confession or other violation of a defendant's right is
never relevant to the issue of voluntariness ...
The appellate
court concluded:
The rule should be stated as follows: . . .an allegation
that the petitioner's constitutional rights were violated . . . is
not, standing alone, sufficient to call the validity of the plea
into question, nonetheless . . . the alleged violations are not
irrelevant to the issue of the voluntariness of the plea. An
alleged violation of constitutional rights is simply another
factor to be taken into account in determining the voluntariness of the plea. On the other hand, the fact that the petitioner
was represented by counsel and acted after consultation with
counsel is also to be given substantial weight in determining
the issue of voluntariness of plea.27
This statement seems very different from the assertion that a
guilty plea should be set aside whenever the plea would not have been
entered had there not been a coerced confession. Indeed, the court
of appeals emphasized that a violation of constitutional rights would
not, standing alone, call the validity of a guilty plea into question.
In United States ex rel. Richardson v. McMann,8 another of the
cases that came before the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit said:
The existence or threatened use of a coerced confession
may not itself render the guilty plea involuntary. A defendant
the Second Circuit's rulings without reference to this qualification. As the text following this
note indicates, the Court thereby addressed itself to a spurious issue.
25. 409 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1969), vacated sub nom. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759 (1970).
26. Id. at 1022 (emphasis in original).
27. Id. at 1021.
28. 408 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969), vacated, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
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who has a basis for claiming that his confession was coerced
may nevertheless elect to forego that claim and to plead
guilty-whether because of "his own knowledge of his guilt
and a desire to take his medicine," . . . because "he also
knows that other admissible evidence will establish his guilt
overwhelmingly," . . . because he prefers to plead guilty to
a lesser charge rather than run the risk of conviction on a
more serious charge; or because for some other reason he
determines that it is in his best interest to plead guilty."
The Second Circuit thus asserted what the McMann opinion went to
elaborate pains to demonstrate-a defendant may, for tactical reasons, make a binding waiver of the right to challenge the admissibility
of a confession. The fact that subsequent developments might show
the waiver to have been unwise would not entitle the defendant to
relief. All in all, therefore, the Supreme Court's opinion in McMann
seemed unrelated to both the factual circumstances of the cases before the Court and the legal principles that the court of appeals had
applied in resolving these cases. Were it not for the fact that the
Supreme Court did vacate the appellate court's judgments, one would
be tempted to regard almost the entire McMann opinion as dictum.30
C. The Issue the Supreme Court Apparently Regarded as
Determinative- Whether a Guilty Plea Should Be Set Aside
if "Triggered" By an Involuntary Confession
Ironically, although the Second Circuit had never taken the position that the Supreme Court attributed to it, the Supreme Court itself
had come very close to doing so. In Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v.
Claudy,3 ' the Court had said, "[A] conviction following trial or on
a plea of guilty based on a confession extorted by violence or by
mental coercion is invalid under the Federal Due Process Clause
. .. ." The three Justices who dissented in McMann relied on this
decision, and Mr. Justice Brennan wrote, "[I]f the coerced confession
induces a guilty plea, that plea . . . is the fruit of the State's prior
29.
30.

Id. at 53.
Only the Court's discussion of Jackson v. Denno and its significance seems directed

to a bona fide issue in the case.
31. 350 U.S. 116 (1956).
32. Id. at 118. The McMann majority distinguished this case by noting that it had
involved an uncounseled defendant and by confining the apparently unqualified language of the
opinion to that situation. 397 U.S. at 767 & n.12. Compare Harrison v. United States, 392
U.S. 219 (1968), in which Mr. Justice White argued in dissent that the majority's reasoning
would compel the conclusion that "an inadmissible confession preceding a plea of guilty would
taint the plea." Id. at 234.
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illegal conduct, and thus is vulnerable to attack."33 The Second
Circuit had plainly articulated a narrower rationale for its decisions-a rationale that considered, not only whether an allegedly
coerced confession had "induced" a guilty plea, but also whether the
defendant had knowingly compromised his claim of coercion or had
simply pleaded guilty in ignorance of his rights.34 Although the Supreme Court never considered this narrower rationale," it seems
appropriate to examine the issue on which the majority and the dissent took issue-whether a guilty plea triggered by an involuntary
confession should be set aside as "fruit of the poisonous tree."
Analysis can begin with a simple though extreme hypothetical
case: A coerced confession has been offered at trial, and the defendant, after having been informed of his right to have the confession
excluded, has announced that he prefers to allow the confession into
evidence. The confession then leads to the defendant's conviction, and
33. 397 U.S. at 79-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
34. An involuntary confession can "cause" a guilty plea in either situation. When a
defendant has recognized that the admissibility of his confession is problematic and has made
a deliberate decision to compromise the issue, the confession "causes" the plea in the sense
that the plea would not have been entered had the defendant not confessed. (Of course one can
know that the confession was involuntary only if the defendant is able to disregard the compromise that he has made and to litigate the claim of involuntariness that he has knowingly
abandoned, but once this hurdle has been crossed, it can be seen in retrospect that an involuntary confession was a sine qua non of the defendant's plea.) Similarly, a defendant unaware of
his rights might not have pleaded guilty had he not erroneously assumed that any confession
would insure his conviction; again, the prior violation of his rights, if there was one, can be
seen as a "cause" of his plea.
35. Perhaps the Court did not address this rationale because it was beyond any refutation
that the Court could provide. In essence, the Second Circuit had held that although a defendant
could, by entering a bargained plea, knowingly and voluntarily waive a claim that his confession
had been coerced, it was necessary to examine the underlying facts to determine whether he
had done so. If, for example, the defendant had been unaware of his legal rights at the time
that he pleaded guilty, his plea would not constitute an intelligent waiver. Various district courts
had acted as though a guilty plea automatically waived the defendant's rights whatever the
circumstances, and the Second Circuit held that a denial of relief on the basis of this theory
required reversal. Sensible though it was, the Second Circuit's position would apparently have
opened the door to hearings that the Supreme Court was unwilling to provide. For Mr. Justice
White and his brethren in McMann, the life of the law has apparently not been logic but
experience. (At least it has not been logic.)
The position that the Second Circuit had adopted in its guilty-plea rulings was even more
clearly articulated in a Fifth Circuit opinion by Judge John Minor Wisdom:
The [guilty] plea represents the relinquishment of a bundle of defenses, and has no
magical implications with regard to finality beyond that. The whole does not exceed
the sum of its parts. If one of the component waivers was ineffective because of the
inadequate knowledge upon which it was made, the defect is not cured by virtue of
the fact that the waiver was made implicitly, as pa-t of a guilty plea.
United States v. Lucia, 416 F.2d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 1969), modified en banc, 423 F.2d 697
(1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971). (A majority of the Fifth Circuit, en banc, affirmed
the result but withdrew the section of Judge Wisdom's opinion containing the above analysis.)
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the defendant maintains that his conviction is "fruit of the poisonous
tree." He notes that he would not have been convicted were it not for
the state's prior illegal action. In this situation, the defendant's
conviction would surely be valid. His intervening choice would undoubtedly be held to "dissipate the taint" of the illegal methods by
which the confession was obtained.
This illustration is, of course, entirely unreal. In all probability,
no defendant would "knowingly and voluntarily" choose to be convicted on the basis of a coerced confession. Nevertheless, the illustration directs attention to an issue that the dissenting Justices seemed
to ignore in McMann-the quality of a defendant's choice. If, as I
believe, bargained guilty pleas are inherently involuntary,36 they certainly should not "dissipate the taint" of prior violations of a defendant's constitutional rights. The dissenting Justices, however, apparently did not intend to challenge the constitutionality of plea bargaining; and if, in other contexts, a bargained guilty plea is seen as reflecting a voluntary choice, it is difficult to understand why this choice,
when made with understanding, should not "dissipate the taint" of
the methods by which a coerced confession has been obtained." If
it is permissible for a defendant to compromise the basic issue of his
guilt or innocence through plea bargaining, I see no reason why he
should be unable to compromise the question of the voluntariness of
his confession in the same way. From my perspective, therefore, the
constitutional vice in McMann did not lie in the fact that coerced
confessions were a sine qua non of the defendants' pleas but rather
in the inherent pressures of the guilty-plea system. 8
36. See text accompanying notes 159-232 infra.
37. This statement considers only the dissipating effect of a bargainedguilty plea, and
the defendants in McMann did plead guilty to offenses less serious than those with which they
were charged initially. Despite the majority's intimations to the contrary, it is doubtful that, in
the absence of bargaining, a defendant would choose to plead guilty simply because a confession
would probably be held admissible. So long as there was any chance that the confession might
be excluded, it would apparently be in the defendant's interest to secure a judicial ruling on
the issue unless he had been offered some concession for foregoing that right. The question that
divided the majority and the dissent in McMann therefore seems likely to arise only in the
context of guilty-plea bargaining, and I believe that the propriety of this bargaining is ultimately
determinative of the issue.
38. 1 again emphasize that I am referring only to the situation in which a defendant has
knowingly compromised a constitutional claim through plea bargaining. To ask after the fact
whether a constitutional violation was a sine qua non of the defendant's plea would make this
sort of compromise impossible. The defendant would be permitted to litigate his claim as
though the compromise had not been made, and if the claim were upheld, the compromise
would be set aside. Under the premises of the guilty-plea system, therefore, the compromise of
a constitutional claim should probably "dissipate the taint" of any unconstitutional action that
gave rise to the claim. A bargained guilty plea entered in ignorance of the defendant's rights,
however, should not be considered an "accord and satisfaction" and should not have this
dissipating effect. See text accompanying notes 108-20 infra.
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D. A More Basic Issue- The Significance of Jackson v. Denno and
Its Retroactive Application (Herein Also of Some Post-Trilogy
Decisions That Seem to Depart From McMann)

Once New York's pre-Jackson v. Denno procedures are added
to the picture, even a defender of guilty-plea bargaining could reasonably disagree with the ruling in McMann. The defendants in this case
confronted not only the inherent pressures of the guilty-plea system
(promises of leniency in exchange for their pleas) but threats that, if
they stood trial, the trials would not be fair. As a descriptive matter,
the defendants and their attorneys may have been required to weigh
the prospect of a constitutional challenge to New York's procedures
against the advantages of entering pleas of guilty. The significant
question, however, is why the defendants and their attorneys should
have been required to weigh this factor-why the threat of an unfair
trial is a permissible one for the state to inject into, the pleadetermination process.39
To say that when a defendant admits his guilt "he does so under
the law then existing" is plainly to beg this question. When a constitutional decision is applied retroactively, defendants who have been
convicted at trial are afforded relief from the unfair procedures that
have brought about their convictions. The fact that these defendants
were convicted "under the law then existing" is not regarded as determinative. When exactly the same procedures have brought about the
conviction of other defendants on pleas of guilty, it is not at all
apparent why they should be denied the same relief."
The Supreme Court agreed that a conviction at trial need not
"stop the clock" on evolving concepts of justice, but it apparently
concluded that a plea of guilty should preclude the application of new
judicial insights. In adopting this position, the Court may not have
fully considered its implications, and indeed, in post-McMann
decisions, the Court has retreated from the seemingly unqualified
position that it adopted in McMann.
The departure from McMann began sub silentio in Robinson v.
Neil." After the defendant in Robinson had been tried and convicted
39. In fact it seems doubtful that the defense attorneys in McMann considered the
possible unconstitutionality of New York's pre-Jackson v. Denno procedures-and even more
doubtful that the defendants in McMann secured any discount in their sentences by forgoing
challenges to these procedures.
40. McMann illustrates how quickly the Supreme Court can alter its fundamental approach to a basic legal question. The Court first applied a ruling on criminal procedure prospectively in 1965. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). Five years later, the Court seemed
to hold in McMann that virtually all criminal procedure rulings would be applied only prospectively for all criminal defendants save the small minority who have exercised the right to trial.
41. 409 U.S. 505 (1973).
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of assault and battery in a Tennessee municipal court, a state grand
jury returned an indictment against him for assault with intent to
murder. Although this indictment was apparently based on.the same
acts that had been alleged in the municipal court prosecution, the
defendant pleaded guilty. At the time of his guilty plea in 1962, he
had little basis for a claim that the state's felony prosecution violated
the federal constitution by twice placing him in jeopardy for the same
offense. The Supreme Court had not yet held the double jeopardy
provision of the fifth amendment applicable to the states," and the
Court's ruling in Waller v. Florida3 that states and municipalities
should not be viewed as separate sovereignties in applying the double
jeopardy principle was eight years in the future. Neither the Supreme
Court nor the parties, however, averted to McMann or attached
significance to the fact that the defendant had pleaded guilty. As they
saw it, the question in Robinson was simply whether Waller should
be applied retroactively. When the Court answered this question in
the affirmative, it unanimously held that habeas corpus relief would
be appropriate. The Court's opinion by Mr. Justice Rehnquist did not
suggest that the defendant had pleaded guilty "under the law then
existing" or that, because he had been represented by a reasonably
competent attorney, his guilty plea foreclosed any inquiry into the
merits of his double jeopardy claim.
Of course Robinson should not be read as resolving an issue that
the Supreme Court did not consider. Nevertheless, the fact that the
case proceeded through three tiers of the federal judicial system without advertence to the issue on the part of any lawyer or judge indicates that McMann's concept of "half-retroactivity" does not accord
with an intuitive sense of justice and, indeed, does not correspond to
the way in which lawyers and judges naturally formulate the issue
when a problem of retroactivity is presented.
Although Robinson's departure from McMann may have been
inadvertent, the Supreme Court considered a similar issue and effectively reaffirmed the Robinson result in Blackledge v. Perry." Again
the defendant had been tried and convicted of misdemeanor assault.
Unlike the defendant in Robinson, however, he had been convicted
in a lower state court and then had sought a trial de novo in a state
court of general jurisdiction. Before this trial de novo could be held,
a grand jury had indicted the defendant for felonious assault. Al42.
U.S. 319
43.
44.

See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302
(1937).
397 U.S. 387 (1970).
417 U.S. 21 (1974).
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though the indictment was based on the conduct that had been alleged
in the misdemeanor prosecution, the defendant pleaded guilty.
Without considering the defendant's double jeopardy claim, the
Supreme Court held the felony prosecution unconstitutional as a
matter of due process. The Court invoked its 1969 ruling in North
Carolina v. Pearce," observing that the prosecutor might have sought
the felony indictment to penalize the defendant for asserting his right
to a trial de novo. The Court concluded that invalidation of the felony
prosecution was necessary to eliminate this possibility of prosecutorial "vindictiveness."
The Court then considered the state's argument that the defendant's competently counseled guilty plea precluded inquiry into the
claim that his felony prosecution was unconstitutional. In support of
this argument, the state had relied, not only on McMann and the
other cases of the guilty-plea trilogy, but also on Tollett v.
Henderson," a more recent decision that had held a guilty plea an
absolute bar to a claim of unconstitutional racial discrimination in
the selection of a grand jury. 7 The Supreme Court concluded that
there was a "fundamental distinction" between these prior cases and
Perry:
Although the underlying claims presented in Tollett and the
Brady trilogy were of constitutional dimensions, none went to
the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court
to answer the charge brought against him. . . . In the case
at hand, by contrast, . . . [h]aving chosen originally to proceed on the misdemeanor charge in the District Court, the
State of North Carolina was . . . simply precluded by the
Due Process Clause from calling upon the respondent to answer to the more serious charge in the Superior Court. ...
[T]he right that [the defendant] asserts and that we today
accept is the right not to be haled into court at all upon the
felony charge. ...
' * *That being so, it follows that his guilty plea did not
foreclose him from attacking his conviction in the Superior
Court proceedings through a federal writ of habeas corpus."
The Court did not explain the significance of the distinction that
it drew. The defendant in Perry was presumably represented by a
competent attorney, and this attorney had as much opportunity to
45. 395
46. 411
47. See
48. 417

U.S. 711 (1969).
U.S. 258 (1973).
text accompanying notes 84-94 infra.
U.S. at 30-31.
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assert claims that would have precluded the defendant's second trial
as he had to assert any other claims. It seems well established that
most constitutional claims that can bar a defendant's trial-double
jeopardy, speedy trial, and presumably the due process claim involved
in Perry itself-can be waived.49 If the guilty pleas in the prior cases
precluded inquiry into the rights there asserted, it is not apparent why
the guilty plea in Perry did not have the same effect.
Indeed, a defendant fully aware of a double jeopardy or due
process objection to a pending prosecution might knowingly sacrifice
this claim in exchange for sentencing concessions; he might recognize
that if a pretrial hearing on his claim resulted in an adverse ruling,
his bargaining position would be severely weakened. 0 Given the
premises of the guilty-plea system, this sort of knowing compromise
of a disputed legal issue should presumably be upheld, yet the Perry
opinion did not discuss the quality of the defendant's choice and thus
left open the possibility that even a defendant who had knowingly
abandoned a right "not to be haled into court at all" could later undo
the compromise and secure relief.
Although the Court may thus have intimated that a guilty plea
could never bar inquiry into a claim of the sort that the defendant
asserted, it seems very doubtful that the Supreme Court would actually grant relief in a case of knowing waiver. Implicit in the Court's
opinion may have been a recognition that Perry was not such a case.
In a plain departure from its approach in McMann, the Supreme
Court refused to presume a sufficiently knowing waiver simply because the defendant had been represented by competent counsel. It
would have been entirely sensible for the Court to recognize that there
had not been a knowing waiver. The decision in North Carolina v.
Pearce was only four months old at the time of the defendant's guilty
plea, and it would not have been apparent, even to a reasonably
competent attorney, that a decision restricting a judge's power to
impose a more severe sentence following a retrial for the same offense
could preclude prosecutions based on possible prosecutorial "vindictiveness" altogether. If the Court was unwilling to apply the
McMann fiction in Perry, however, the question remains why it created the fiction in McMann. In McMann, the absence of a knowing
waiver or compromise had seemed equally clear."
49. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529 (1972) (speedy trial); Harris v. United
States, 237 F.2d 274, 277 (8th Cir. 1956) (double jeopardy); Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 302 (1958)
(speedy trial); Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 285 (1949) (double jeopardy).
50. See Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50,
79-83 (1968).
51. The Supreme Court suggested a second possible distinction between Perry and the
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Because the Court offered no explanation of why a right not to
be "called to answer" should be treated differently from other rights,
it is difficult to tell what rights fall into this apparently exceptional

category. One might have thought, for example, that a defendant
could not be "haled into court" in the absence of a constitutionally
valid indictment, but prior to Perry, Tollett v. Henderson had held

that a competently counseled guilty plea foreclosed any inquiry into
this issue. The Perry opinion explained that the invalid indictment in
Tollett did not prevent the defendant from being called to answer
because a new and properly constituted grand jury could have re-

turned a different indictment." Thus, although the defendant in
Tollett could not properly have been called to answer in the proceedings that resulted in his conviction, the fact that he could have been

called to answer in a different proceeding was apparently enough to
foreclose his constitutional claim.

One might also have thought that a successful challenge to the
constitutionality of the statute that a defendant had been accused of

violating would constitute an absolute bar to his prosecution. This
defect could not be remedied by, securing a new indictment or even
by passing a new, properly drafted statute, for a new statute could

not be applied ex post facto to conduct that had occurred prior to its
prior cases when it said, "Unlike the defendant in Tollett, Perry is not complaining of 'antecedent constitutional violations' or of a 'deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior
to the entry of the guilty plea.'" 417 U.S. at 30. Again, however, the Court did not explain
what difference this circumstance should make. The defendant's attorney, by filing a motion
to dismiss the indictment, could have challenged the "contemporaneous" violation of the
defendant's rights as easily as he could have challenged any "antecedent" violation, but he did
not do so. If the entry of a plea of guilty precludes inquiry into "antecedent" violations, it is
difficult to understand why it does not preclude inquiry into "contemporaneous" violations as
well.
If the Court's distinction mattered, moreover, there is a clear sense in which the alleged
violation of the defendant's rights in Perry was antecedent to his plea. The Court emphasized
that the defendant could not constitutionally have been haled into court, yet the defendant had
obviously been indicted and brought into court prior to the entry of his plea. Indeed, by filing
a motion to dismiss the proceedings, the defendant could have secured a judicial resolution of
his constitutional claim before he pleaded.
Finally, it is not at all apparent that the defendants in the prior cases were complaining of
"antecedent" violations of their rights. In McMann, each defendant did, of course, allege that
an "antecedent" constitutional violation had occurred at the time that his confession was
obtained. It was, however, a somewhat different constitutional violation-one that would occur
at trial when the involuntary confession was received in evidence-that had allegedly motivated
his plea. This "contemporaneous" or, perhaps, "threatened subsequent" violation supplied the
basic grievance. Moreover, there was even more clearly no "antecedent" violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights in Brady v. United States, where the defendant claimed that
his guilty plea had been induced by the threat that an unconstitutional death sentence would
be imposed following a trial.
52. 417 U.S. at 30.
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enactment. Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Powell recently filed a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice Stewart, the author of the Perry
opinion, joined; in it, he rejected the view that a competently counseled defendant who had pleaded guilty could ever challenge the constitutionality of the statute under which he had been prosecuted.
The plaintiffs in Ellis v. Dyson,53 a federal civil rights action,
had previously pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of violating a
loitering ordinance. They sought a declaratory judgment that the
ordinance was unconstitutional and an order requiring expunction of
their records of arrest and conviction. The Supreme Court majority
held that the trial court had improperly invoked the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris" in dismissing the complaint and remanded the case-directing the trial court to consider other possible
grounds for dismissal. The majority noted that it had no occasion to
consider the effect of the plaintiffs' pleas of nolo contendere in the
earlier loitering prosecution.55
Mr. Justice Powell contended in dissent, however, that "any relief as to petitioners' previous arrests and convictions is barred by
their nolo contendere pleas.""6 He argued that the "scope of collateral attack" in a federal civil rights action could be no broader
than that permitted in a habeas corpus proceeding, and he said:
If petitioners had been confined as a result of their nolo
contendere pleas and thereafter filed habeas corpus petitions
in federal court, there can be no doubt that their petitions
should have been dismissed. As noted above, the nolo
contendere pleas were equivalent to guilty pleas. It is settled
that when defendants plead guilty to state criminal charges,
they may not seek federal habeas corpus relief on the basis
of constitutional claims antecedent to and independent of the
guilty pleas.57
The Justice added in a footnote:
Nor is this case like Blackledge v. Perry. In that case the
Court stated that the due process right at issue, closely analogous to the constitutional double jeopardy bar, was "the right
53. 421 U.S. 426 (1975).
54. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
55. 421 U.S. at 435. Mr. Justice Rehnquist indicated that he joined the majority opinion
only because he read it "as intimating no views . . . contrary to those suggested by my
dissenting Brethren" on the issues that they discussed (including the significance of the nolo
contendere pleas). Id. at 437. Justice Rehnquist's reading of the majority opinion seems entirely
accurate on this point.
56. Id. at 438 (Powell, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 441.
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not to be haled into court at all . . . " so that "[t]he very
initiation of the proceedings . . . operated to deny
[petitioner] due process of law." The Court ruled, therefore,
that petitioners' guilty plea did not preclude federal habeas
corpus relief. In this case, however, petitioners' claim is that
the ordinance under which they had been charged is unconstitutional. The alleged constitutional infirmity thus lies not in
the "initiation of the proceedings" but in the eventual imposition of punishment that, assertedly, the State cannot constitutionally exact. 8
Even under the ill-defined Perry standard, Justice Powell's conclusion seems unwarranted. A successful motion to dismiss a charge
filed under an unconstitutional statute would plainly preclude not
only a defendant's punishment but his trial. Moreover, the Supreme
Court held as early as 1879 that prosecution under an unconstitutional statute constituted a "jurisdictional" error-an error that
could be asserted in habeas corpus proceedings even under the restrictive view of habeas corpus jurisdiction then prevalent and that could
not be waived even by a guilty plea. The Court said in Ex parte
Siebold:
The validity of the judgments is assailed on the gound that the
acts of Congress under which the indictments were found are
unconstitutional. If this position is well taken, it affects the
foundation of the whole proceeding. An unconstitutional law
is void, and is as no law. . . .A conviction under it is not
merely erroneous, but is illegal and void, and cannot be a
legal cause of imprisonment. . . .[Plersonal liberty is of so
great moment in the eye of the law that . . . the question of
the court's authority to try and imprison the party may be
reviewed on habeas corpus . . .
Despite Justice Powell's assertion that there could be "no doubt"
that habeas corpus petitions by persons in the plaintiffs' situation
should be dismissed, the Siebold doctrine has been consistently ap58. Id. at 441-42 n.7 (citations omitted).
59. 100 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1879). Siebold apparently did not present an issue of waiver
but merely a question of whether the defendant's claim was cognizable in a habeas corpus
proceeding. Nevertheless, answering one question necessarily answered the other, for the concept of "jurisdictional error" was used both to determine what claims could be heard in habeas
corpus and to determine what claims could not be waived. For that reason, one virtually never
discovers a discussion of waiver in early habeas corpus cases. For an early holding that a guilty
plea does not waive an objection to the validity of an indictment, see Fletcher v. State, 12 Ark.
169 (1851).
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plied, even in guilty plea cases, throughout the twentieth century.'"
Indeed, in a habeas corpus decision in 1921, the Supreme Court itself
resolved a challenge to the constitutionality of a criminal statute on
the merits despite the fact that the petitioner had pleaded guilty to
violating this law."' Before courts began insisting on knowing waivers
in constitutional adjudication, the standard judicial rubric was merely
that a guilty plea waived nonjurisdictionaldefects in the proceedings."2 The doctrine was, in fact, sometimes stated more narrowly:
"[A] plea of guilty waive[s] all defenses other than that the indictment
charged no offenses under the laws ... ."I' That Justices Powell
and Stewart would have undone even this basic limitation on the
scope of a guilty-plea waiver illustrates how our current dependency
on guilty pleas has altered judicial attitudes.
The Court and individual Justices seem to be foundering in their
efforts to apply the Perry standard. The Court has apparently recognized that the McMann logic sometimes leads to unacceptable results, but it has not found a meaningful device for separating claims
that should survive a guilty plea from claims that should not. It is
difficult to perceive any coherent policy in the proposition that a
claim for speedy trial may survive a guilty plea while a claim that a
defendant has been charged under an unconstitutional statute may
not. In affording special status to claims that attack "the very power
of the State to bring the defendant into court," the Supreme Court
seemed to reach for something like the concept of "jurisdictional
error" that once determined the scope of the habeas corpus remedy
in guilty-plea and non-guilty-plea cases alike. Even under that nowabandoned concept, however, the courts were more successful in developing sensible policy than they seem likely to be under the standard of Blackledge v. Perry.
A more thorough-going retreat from McMann seems necessary,
and the case that Justice Powell addressed in Ellis v. Dyson-that of
a defendant who has pleaded guilty to violating an unconstitutional
60. See, e.g., Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371, 374 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), affd, 406
U.S. 913 (1972); Annot., 32 A.L.R. 1054 (1924). Moreover, the Fourth Circuit recently held
that under the doctrine of Blackledge v. Perry a defendant could, even following a guilty plea,
challenge the constitutionality of the statute that he had been accused of violating. United
States v. Bluso, 519 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1975).

61.

Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224 (1921). See Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S.

170, 174-75 (1954) (resolution on the merits of claim that proceedings had not been authorized
by Attorney General although defendant had pleaded nolo contendere).
62. See, e.g., Weir v. United States, 92 F.2d 634, 635 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S.
761 (1937).
63. Rice v.United States, 30 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1929); accord, Kachnic v. United States,
53 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1931).
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statute-suggests two basic defects of the McMann approach. First,
the case illustrates the inequity of McMann's concept of halfretroactivity. A defendant, by his plea, might have admitted conduct
that the Supreme Court has subsequently held may not be punished
at all. For example, he might have pleaded guilty to entering an
interracial marriage at a time when statutes prohibiting miscegenation were considered valid. Were it not for Justice Powell's opinion
in Ellis, it would seem almost unthinkable that the Supreme Court
would continue to hold this defendant in prison for his constitutionally protected behavior and would reassert its McMann contention
that "when the defendant . . . admits his guilt, he does so under the
law then existing." Once the Supreme Court has ruled that certain
acts or omissions are constitutionally protected, it would be manifestly unfair to apply this ruling retroactively only to defendants who
have stood trial, and once this point is recognized in the context of a
guilty plea to a charge of violating a retroactively invalidated statute,
the practice of treating guilty-plea defendants differently from trial
defendants in other retroactivity cases would surely require greater
justification than the Supreme Court has provided.
Second, the sort of case that Justice Powell addressed illustrates
that even a knowing waiver or a deliberate compromise need not
always be conclusive. A defendant charged with miscegenation, with
picketing at a shopping center, or with performing a medically safe
abortion might have recognized a possible constitutional defense to
the charge against him, but after consulting with a highly competent
attorney, he might have decided to compromise this substantive constitutional defense through plea bargaining. It might have been only
after the entry of his guilty plea that the Supreme Court effectively
sustained the contention that he had deliberately abandoned. The
defendant, in the face of "unavoidable uncertainty," might have
made an intelligent choice, but it plainly would be unfair-and functionless-to insist that he continue to live with this choice in prison.
In fact, the problem of the guilty plea to an invalid charge has
arisen in a number of post-McMann cases. In Leary v. United
States, 4 the Supreme Court effectively invalidated a federal statute
that required a person who acquired marihuana to register and pay
a tax. The Court concluded that this statute compelled marihuana
purchasers to incriminate themselves in violation of the fifth amendment. 5 Lower federal courts then considered a series of cases in
64. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
65. Some early interpretations of Leary suggested that the Court had not technically
invalidated the Marihuana Tax Act. Instead the Court had created a "complete defense" to
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which defendants had pleaded guilty to offenses created by the unconstitutional statute. A few courts, relying on McMann, held that these
defendants could properly be punished for their failure to sacrifice
fifth amendment rights; they had pleaded guilty "under the law then

existing."6 Most courts, however, apparently recoiled from the prospect of imposing punishment for non-offenses and in effect concluded
that the Supreme Court could not have meant what it said." If these
courts were correct, it is apparent that the presumed compromise of
a constitutional defense need not be conclusive in the light of subse-

quent judicial developments which show the compromise to have been
unfair. 8
prosecution under the Act-a defense that might be waived by the entry of a plea of guilty.
See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 305 F. Supp. 465 (C.D. Cal. 1969), vacated and remanded,
447 F.2d 991 (9th Cit. 1971). This reading of Leary derived support from the Supreme Court's
indication that a timely assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination might be required,
395 U.S. at 27, and from the fact that corporations, which do not enjoy the privilege against
self-incrimination, could presumably be convicted of violating the Marihuana Tax Act even
after Leary. A year after its decision, however, the Court clarified the situation. In an opinion
that did not mention Leary specifically, but that did address an analogous situation involving
taxes on gambling, the Court made it apparent that Leary would be applied retroactively, and
that a non-corporate defendant's failure to pay the marihuana transfer tax would be treated as
"constitutionally immune from punishment." The Court's view was plainly that the line of selfincrimination cases that included Leary had "dealt with the kind of conduct that cannot
constitutionally be punished in the first instance." United States v. United States Coin &
Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 723 (1971). See United States v. Bluso, 519 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1975).
66. See, e.g., Gaxiola v. United, States, 481 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Weber, 429 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1970), vacated and remanded, 402 U.S. 939 (1971); Shaffer v.
United States, 435 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1970); Weinstein v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 597 (C.D.
Cal. 1971).
67. See, e.g., Flores v. United States, 472 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Broadus, 450 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Hupert v. United States, 448 F.2d 668 (8th Cir.
1971); Bannister v. United States, 446 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1971); Scogin v. United States, 446
F.2d 416 (8th Cir. 1971); Harrington v. United States, 444 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Liguori, 430 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 948 (1971).
68. Two variations on the Leary problem merit separate mention. First, a defendant may
have been charged with violating a valid criminal statute-one prohibiting the sale of marihuana, for example-and he may then have entered a bargained guilty plea to an offense created
by the unconstitutional Tax Act. In this situation, the Tax Act violation would probably have
been selected somewhat arbitrarily for reasons of convenience. The defendant would presumably have been willing to plead guilty to any other marihuana-related offense that fit his conduct-so long as it carried a penalty no greater than that of the Tax Act. To grant relief on
the basis of Leary would therefore be a serendipity for the defendant; he would, by chance,
have entered his plea-of-convenience to an offense that the Supreme Court later held unconstitutional. In such a case, there would, given the premises of the guilty-plea system, be no genuine
unfairness in requiring the defendant to adhere to his intelligent compromise of the valid
charges against him, and a court might therefore be tempted to deny relief.
This "realistic" analysis would rest, however, upon a recognition that punishment had been
imposed for something other than the offense of which the defendant was convicted, The
defendant might respond, "I have never admitted anything beyond a failure to pay the marihuana transfer tax-something that the Supreme Court has now held cannot be punished.

HeinOnline -- 47 U. Colo. L. Rev. 21 1975-1976

22

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

II. THE SECOND CASE OF THE TRILOGY, Parker v. North
Carolina: ABANDONMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT OF A
KNOWING WAIVER BECOMES A BIT MORE APPARENT

The significance of the McMann opinion becomes more readily
apparent when one examines the second case of the guilty-plea trilogy, Parkerv. North Carolina." Like the defendants in McMann, the
defendant in Parker alleged in a post-conviction hearing that an involuntary confession had induced his plea of guilty. The Supreme
Court upheld the validity of the defendant's plea, saying that "the
advice the defendant received was well within the range of competence required of attorneys representing defendants in criminal
cases.'70
Certainly I cannot be imprisoned on the theory that I am probably guilty of other crimes or
would probably have been willing to plead guilty to other crimes."
Most courts have accepted this argument and have granted relief from bargained Marihuana Tax Act convictions. Some of these courts have noted, however, that, absent any violation of the statute of limitations or of the right to a speedy trial, the defendant might still be
prosecuted for the crimes with which he was charged initially. See, e.g., Harrington v. United
States, 444 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Ennis v. Fitzpatrick, 438 F.2d 1201
(2d Cir. 1971).
A few courts have adopted the "realistic" view that a defendant can be punished for a nonoffense so long as he has agreed to accept this punishment in the process of compromising a
more serious charge. When, for example, a defendant who was charged with a more serious
crime has pleaded guilty to a Tax Act violation, the current position of the Ninth Circuit is
apparently that he should be denied relief. See Gaxiola v. United States, 481 F.2d 383 (9th
Cir. 1973). When a defendant who was charged only with a Tax Act violation has pleaded guilty
to that offense, however, relief is available. See Navarro v. United States, 449 F.2d 113 (9th
Cir. 1971). For another expression of the distinction between defendants who have been charged
initially with Tax Act violations and defendants who have been charged initially with more
serious crimes, see Ouilette v. United States, 435 F.2d 21 (10th Cir. 1970).
The second variation on the Leary problem is the opposite of the first: A defendant,
charged initially with violating the unconstitutional Tax Act, has pleaded guilty to a valid lesser
offense. (This situation has not in fact arisen in post-Leary litigation because the Tax Act was,
in effect, "the bottom of the ladder" for federal marihuana defendants.) Despite the defendant's
plea of guilty under a valid statute, one would strongly suspect that he was, in reality, being
punished for his constitutionally protected behavior. This "variation" would probably present
a stronger case for relief than the first, and as a doctrinal matter, relief might be justified on
the theory that the threat of prosecution under an unconstitutional statute rendered the defendant's guilty plea involuntary. But see Parker v, North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
The problem arises because it is utterly impossible to tell what a conviction represents
under the guilty-plea system. When a court wishes to insure that a defendant is not in fact
punished for failing to pay a marihuana transfer tax, it must grant relief in several distinct
situations-that in which the defendant has been charged with failing to pay the tax and has
pleaded guilty to that offense, that in which he has been charged with a greater crime and has
pleaded guilty to the Tax Act violation, and that in which he has been charged with the Tax
Act violation and has pleaded guilty to a lesser offense. In the confusion of the guilty-plea
system, defendants whose only "crime" is failure to pay the tax are likely to be found in all
three categories.
69. 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
70. Id. at 797-98.
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Remarkably, the Court did not reveal what advice, if any, the
defendant had received concerning the significance of his confession.
Indeed, the Court implied that evidence on this issue might be unnecessary. The Court seemed to suggest that the defense attorney could
be presumed to have advised the defendant that his confession would
be admissible simply because the defendant had pleaded guilty:
As we understand it, Parker's position necessarily implies
that his decision to plead rested on the strength of the case
against him: absent the confession, his chances of acquittal
were good and he would have chosen to stand trial; but given
the confession, the evidence was too strong and it was to his
advantage to plead guilty and limit the possible penalty to life
imprisonment. On this assumption, had Parker and his counsel thought the confession inadmissible, there would have
been a plea of not guilty and a trial to a jury. But counsel
apparently deemed the confession admissible. ....
It would have been only a short step for the Court to hold that a
defendant can be presumed to have waived his rights intelligently
because it would have been foolish for him to waive his rights unintelligently.72
In Parker, there was no need for the Court to speculate about
the tactical significance of the defendant's plea of guilty. Unlike the
defendants in McMann, this defendant had been granted a hearing
on his petition for post-conviction relief. The undisputed evidence at
this hearing indicated that the defense attorney had not discussed
with the defendant the possible invalidity of his confession. Thus, the
Supreme Court presumed waiver from a record that expressly contradicted the Court's conclusion.
The defendant in Parker was only fifteen years old at the time
of his arrest, interrogation, and conviction. He was arrested at approximately 11:00 p.m., taken to a police station, and questioned
unsuccessfully for one or two hours. The defendant testified:
After the questioning ended, I was put in a cell by myself.
There was no light in the cell, but there was a light in the hall,
and a little of this light came into the cell. There was a drinking fountain in the cell, but no water in it. I stayed in the cell
until the next day, but I don't know what time it was that I
.1

71. Id. at 796-97 (footnotes omitted).
72. See J. HELLER, CATCH 22 (1961). See also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,
768-69 (1970). In other contexts, the Supreme Court has said that courts should "not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525-26 (1972);
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937).
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came out. I didn't get anything to eat. . . . After being taken
from the cell, I was questioned again by one of the officers
present in the Court today and by Chief Daniels . . . . I told
them I wanted to see my lawyer . . . . They told me to tell
them what I did. I told them . . . . I signed the confession
before I went back in the cell. I stayed there about five minutes and the lawyer came. He was the first person I saw other
than a policeman . . . I saw him about fifteen or twenty
minutes . . . . I saw my attorney again the day I was tried.
My attorney told me that he would do all he could to help

me but there was not much he could do, and about the best
thing I could do was plead guilty. He asked me about the

confession or statement I had given to the police, and he said
that since I had given the confession, there wasn't much he
could do and about the best thing I could do was plead

guilty.73
The defendant was asked on direct examination, "Did you give any
thought to whether or not the police would be permitted to give this

statement in evidence at the trial?" The prosecutor objected to the
question on unspecified grounds, and inexplicably the trial court ruled
the question improper. The defendant's post-conviction petition had,
however, alleged:

The petitioner formed his decision to plead guilty on the basis
of advice by counsel. In arriving at this decision, the petitioner did not consider . . . that he would be able to prevent

the involuntary confession which he had made to the police,
from being used against him at trial . . ..
The attorney who had represented the defendant at the time of

his conviction testified as a witness for the state at the post-conviction
73. Appendix to the Briefs at 41-42, Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970). The
Supreme Court commented, "In the record ... was an abundance of evidence contradicting
Parker's claim of coercion ....
" 397 U.S. at 795. In fact, the defendant's description of the
length and circumstances of his interrogation and of the denial of his request for counsel was
not contradicted by the record in any material respect. The Supreme Court merely relied upon
the defendant's statements that he had not been subjected to threats or promises (statements
that the defendant did not dispute except by mentioning in passing that the police had offered
to help him all they could) and upon his delay of several months in raising the issue. The
defendant's testimony concerning his relationship with his attorney was consistent with that of
the attorney himself, and although the defendant noted that one of the officers who had
interrogated him was "present in the Court today," that officer was not called as a witness.
The credibility of the defendant's testimony seems unimportant, however, for the Supreme
Court was apparently willing to assume the truth of this testimony for purposes of decision.
397 U.S. at 796.
74. Appendix to the Briefs at 5, Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
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hearing. The attorney readily conceded, "I don't specifically recall

that I discussed with [the defendant] at all whether or not the law
would permit me to keep his confession out of evidence.'' 75
The defense attorney did report that once, during the one or two
occasions when he had visited the defendant in jail, he had "questioned him . . . as to whether or not he was threatened in any manner, whether any promises were made to him and whether he was
scared at the time he made the statement. He told me no threats had
been made and no promises had been made, and he said he was not
scared." 76

A capable attorney probably would not have regarded this conversation as an adequate investigation of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's confession. Although the Supreme Court did not
mention the fact, the defendant's interrogation had occurred after the

Court's decision in Escobedo v. Illinois" and prior to its decision in
Miranda v. Arizona.78 The law of confessions was plainly in a state

of flux, and it was doubtful that a person as young as the defendant
could make a valid confession in the absence of counsel and in the
absence of any warning of his rights.7 9 Indeed, the Supreme Court
had indicated as early as 1948 that a confession by a fifteen-year-old
defendant would be invalid if the defendant had not been afforded
80
access to counsel.
75. Id. at 71.
76. Id. at 66-67.
77. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
78. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
79. The Supreme Court did mention the date of the defendant's interrogation in Parker,
and an astute observer might therefore have detected the presence of an Escobedo issue. The
Court, however, did not mention Escobedo or the defendant's claim that his request for counsel
had been denied; it referred only to his claim of "coercion." One might therefore have fallen
into the erroneous assumption that Parker was a pre-Escobedo case.
80. In Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600 (1948), the Court said:
[Wlhen, as here, a mere [fifteen-year-old] child-an easy victim of the law-is before
us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used . . . . [A] lad of tender years
. . .needs counsel and support if he is not to become the victim first of fear, then
of panic. He needs someone on whom to lean lest the overpowering presence of the
law, as he knows it, crush him . . . .No lawyer stood guard to make sure that the
police went so far and no farther, to see to it that they stopped short of the point
where he became the victim of coercion. No counsel or friend was called during the
critical hours of questioning. A photographer was admitted once this lad broke and
confessed. But not even a gesture towards getting a lawyer for him was ever made.
The defendant in Haley had been arrested at midnight and interrogated until 5:00 a.m.
The Court assumed that apart from the length of the interrogation the questioning had not been
abusive. Unlike the defendant in Parker, moreover, the defendant in Haley had been advised
that his statement could be used against him and that he had a right to remain silent. The
Supreme Court nevertheless ruled the confession involuntary. See also Gallegos v. Colorado,
370 U.S. 49 (1962).
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Moreover, the defense attorney apparently did not ask about the
length of the defendant's interrogation, the length of his confinement,
whether he had been allowed food and water, whether his relatives
had been allowed access to him, how many officers had been present
at the interrogation, whether the defendant had ever before been
inside a police station, how far he had progressed in school, whether
he had a history of mental abnormality, or the circumstances of his
arrest. Most importantly, the defense attorney did not ask whether
the defendant had requested and been denied access to counsel.
Under the Escobedo decision, a request for counsel would have been
of critical importance in assessing the admissibility of the confession,
and the defendant later testified that the police had, in fact, denied
his request for legal assistance. Nevertheless, at the post-conviction
hearing, the defense attorney said of the Escobedo decision,
"Whether I had read it at that time I don't know."'"
An examination of the record in Parker thus gives one a fairly
clear idea of what advice the Supreme Court considered "well within
the range of competence required of attorneys representing
defendants in criminal cases." Of course a defendant is not entitled
to "perfect" or "errorless" counsel,"2 and whether the defense attorney in Parker was "competent" may, to some observers, be a debatable issue. Even if this issue were resolved against the defendant, however, one fact would not be debatable: the defendant did not knowingly waive his right to challenge the validity of his confession.
In Parker,as in McMann, the Supreme Court maintained that
whether a guilty plea constitutes a knowing waiver of a defendant's
rights turns on whether he was competently advised by his attorney.
There is nothing inherently illogical about this proposition,8 3 but if
one chooses to adopt it, he must classify as "incompetent" any advice
that does not give the defendant an awareness of his rights sufficient
to permit the exercise of a meaningful choice. Although, in this sense,
the Supreme Court's reasoning was circular, the Court was unwilling
to complete the circle. Instead, it described as competent advice that
plainly left a defendant unaware of his constitutional rights.
81. Appendix to the Briefs at 71, Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
82. MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877
(1961).
83. In accepting the logic of the Court's equation of a knowing guilty plea with a competently counseled guilty plea, one must set aside the case of a defendant who lacks the mental
capacity to understand his attorney's competent advice. This defendant probably could not be
convicted of an offense; he would be classified as incompetent to stand trial or to plead guilty.
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A. A Post-Trilogy Decision, Tollett v. Henderson: Abandonment of
the Requirement of a Knowing Waiver Finally Becomes Explicit

The Supreme Court's implicit abandonment of the requirement
of a knowing waiver in McMann and Parkerrose to the surface when
the Court decided Tollett v. Henderson" three years later. In 1948,
the defendant in this case had been indicted for murder by a Tennessee grand jury from which blacks had been systematically excluded.
He had pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a prison term of 99 years.
The defendant testified that, at the time of his plea, he was unaware
of the methods by which grand jurors were selected and did not know
of his right to challenge the composition of the grand jury. The
defendant's attorney reported that he, too, had been unaware of the
unconstitutional exclusion of blacks and said that he had not advised
the defendant of his right to seek dismissal of the indictment.
Both a federal district court and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that the defendant was entitled to habeas corpus relief. Judge Anthony J. Celebrezze's opinion
for the court of appeals distinguished the guilty-plea trilogy:
That line of cases did not establish a new general test for
examining conduct alleged to constitute a waiver of federal
rights; in fact it reemphasized the importance of [the requirement of a knowing waiver] . .

.

.It did not suggest that a

valid guilty plea waived the right to challenge all pre-pleading
defects when a defendant neither knew nor could have known
of the right at the time he entered his plea. 5
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and observed:
In McMann v. Richardson, .

.

. the Court laid down the

general rule by which federal collateral attacks on convictions
based on guilty pleas rendered with the advice of counsel were
to be governed:
"In our view a defendant's plea of guilty based on reasonably competent advice is an intelligent plea not open
to attack on the ground that counsel may have misjudged the admissibility of the defendant's confession.
Whether a plea of guilty is unintelligent and therefore
vulnerable when motivated by a confession erroneously
thought admissible in evidence depends as an initial mat84.
85.
(1973).

411 U.S.58 (1973).
Henderson v. Tollett, 459 F.2d 237, 242 n.5 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 258
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ter, not on whether a court would retrospectively consider counsel's advice to be right or wrong, but on
whether that advice was within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.""6
In Tollett, there was no "misjudgment" by the defense attorney
and no "advice." The attorney was concededly ignorant of the problem, and the Supreme Court ultimately agreed that the guilty-plea
trilogy was distinguishable. The Court nevertheless concluded that
Tollett was sufficiently analogous to McMann to warrant the same
result. Mr. Justice Rehnquist wrote:
If the issue were to be cast solely in terms of "waiver," the
Court of Appeals was undoubtedly correct in concluding that
there had been no such waiver here. But just as the guilty
pleas in the . . . trilogy were found to foreclose direct inquiry
into the merits of claimed antecedent constitutional violations
there, we conclude that the respondent's guilty plea here alike
forecloses independent inquiry into the claim of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury.8"
The Court did not explain why the defendant's guilty plea, if not
a "waiver" of his constitutional rights, foreclosed inquiry into
whether those rights had been violated. It merely asserted that "a
guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process" and that
[w]hen a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open
court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is
charged, . . . [h]e may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice
he received from counsel was not within the standards set
88
forth in McMann.
At the end of its opinion, the Court quoted the statement of a
judge of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals that "[n]o lawyer
in this State would have ever thought of objecting to the fact that
Negroes did not serve on the Grand Jury in Tennessee in 1948." In
light of this statement, the Court concluded, "[T]he chances of respondent's being able to carry the necessary burden of proof in challenging the guilty plea would appear slim." 89 The Court nevertheless
86. 411 U.S. at 264.
87. Id. at 266.
88. Id. at 267. For a discussion of one possible interpretation of this language-that
advanced by Mr. Justice White and three other Justices in Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S.
283 (1975)-see text accompanying notes 95-107 infra.
89. 411 U.S. at 269. The Court reached this conclusion without exploring the reasons
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remanded the case for further consideration of this issue-

"ifit be

open to respondent under federal habeas practice .... "I"
If the Supreme Court had focused more on the character of the
right that the defendant asserted and less on the supposed difference
between a plea of guilty and a conviction at trial, I believe that it
could have written a sound opinion in support of its result." Defen-

dants may be permitted to challenge the racial composition of grand
juries for two basic reasons-to protect their own right to an unbiased
determination of probable cause and to advance the public's interest
in abolishing racial discrimination in the administration of justice.
The Supreme Court has, in fact, permitted defendants to challenge
the composition of grand juries even after their conviction by pro-

perly selected trial juries,92 and in this situation, it seems doubtful that
the Court's rulings can be explained in terms of insuring fair proce-

dure for the defendants themselves. A finding of guilt beyond a rea-

sonable doubt by a properly constituted trial jury plainly establishes
probable cause to place the defendant on trial and more. Defects in
the initial determination of probable cause can therefore be seen, in
retrospect, not to have affected substantial rights of the defendant. 3
why few if any lawyers would have "thought of objecting to the fact that Negroes did not serve
on the Grand Jury in Tennessee in 1948." If Tennessee lawyers acquiesced in an unconstitutional practice simply because they approved of it or because they would have incurred personal
resentment by challenging it, that fact would not suggest that their clients had received the
effective assistance of counsel but just the reverse. In Tollett, the court of appeals conceded
that the defense attorney's performance had been "competent judged by the time and place at
which it was given," but it nevertheless characterized this performance as "grossly inadequate
in light of the clearly established law of the period." Henderson v. Tollett, 459 F2d 237, 242
n.5 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 258 (1973). Cf The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.
1932) (L. Hand, J.) ("there are precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard
will not excuse their omission").
90. 411 U.S. at 269. Mr. Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion joined by Mr. Justice
Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan, emphasized some additional differences between Tollett and
McMann. In Tollett, there was no question of evaluating a guilty plea by current law rather
than "the law then existing;" indictments by grand juries from which blacks had been systematically excluded had been held invalid for almost 100 years. Mr. Justice Marshall also observed
that the guilty-plea trilogy was "premised on the notion of bargain and exchange." Id. at 27 1.
Because the defendant in Tollett was never informed of his rights, he could not have sacrificed
those rights to gain some advantage. The dissent concluded that the defendant had "amply
demonstrated that he is entitled to relief on any acceptable theory of voluntariness, right to
effective assistance of counsel, or waiver.
...
Id. at 269.
91. Indeed, the Court could have rejected the defendant's contentions without remanding
the case for further proceedings.
92. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Pierre v.
Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939).
93. See Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 302 (1950) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting). Mr. Justice
Jackson noted that a state is not required to secure a grand-jury indictment before placing a
person on trial and that a grand jury need not be unanimous to indict. These facts made it
especially doubtful that defects in the composition of a grand jury could be seen as affecting a
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To require a fresh determination of probable cause and a new finding
of guilt in one sense seems an idle gesture; at the same time, affording
this remedy may provide the only effective means of correcting an
unconstitutional practice that would otherwise persist.
In Tollett, the defendant had not been convicted by a trial jury,
but had pleaded guilty. If what I regard as the inherent dangers of
any bargained guilty plea are set aside, the defendant's plea can be
seen as establishing his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Defects in
the grand jury's finding of probable cause again seem harmless in the
sense that they did not affect substantial rights of the defendant;
public administrative interests must apparently become the dominant
concern. These public interests were, however, ephemeral or nonexistent in Tollett. The defendant had been indicted 25 years before his
case came before the Supreme Court, and there was no reason to
suppose that the unconstitutional practices of Tennessee's past generation still required corrective measures of any kind. Habeas corpus
relief in Tollett was therefore unnecessary either to insure fairness to
the defendant himself, or to protect public interests. Because this
relief would serve no valid function, the lower courts erred in granting
it.
This rationale for the result in Tollett would apply equally to a
case in which a defendant who had been convicted at trial sought
years later to challenge the racial composition of the grand jury that
had indicted him. The possible interests of the defendant would remain the same, and so would the public interest in preserving the
finality of his conviction. Nevertheless, Tollett expressly left open the
possibility that a defendant convicted at trial might later secure habeas corpus relief by challenging the propriety of his indictment. 4
Rather than balance the harms and benefits of affording relief by
examining the objectives of the right in question, the Court relied on
the magic of a guilty plea to justify its result.
B. Mr. Justice White's Current View of Tollett and the Guilty-Plea
Trilogy
In a recent dissenting opinion joined by three other Justices, Mr.
defendant's right to fundamental fairness after his conviction by a unanimous, fairly selected
trial jury.
94. 411 U.S. at 260-61 n.1. In a decision announced the same day as Tollett, the Court
indicated that a federal defendant convicted at trial would be foreclosed from challenging the
composition of the grand jury that had indicted him when he had not raised the issue prior to
trial, when the facts giving rise to the challenge were known or discoverable prior to trial, and
when no prejudice was shown, Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973) (decision based on
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2)).
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Justice White, the author of the guilty-plea trilogy, offered a more
complete explanation of Tollett's somewhat cryptic language. New
York statutes now permit defendants to appeal the denial of motions
to suppress unlawfully seized evidence and unlawfully obtained confessions even after the entry of pleas of guilty.9" These statutes reflect
a sensible recognition that rulings on pretrial motions can effectively
resolve the case against a defendant and that very little function is
served by a trial that a defendant demands solely to preserve his right
to appeal pretrial rulings. The issue in Lefkowitz v. Newsome" was
whether a defendant whose guilty plea in a state court plainly had not
waived a federal constitutional claim as a matter of state law would
nevertheless be foreclosed from asserting that claim in federal habeas
corpus proceedings.
The Supreme Court majority, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart, concluded that the significance of a guilty plea is determined by
the law of the jurisdiction that conducts the proceedings in which the
plea is entered. The Court observed that in most states:
A defendant who chooses to plead guilty rather than go to
trial in effect deliberately refuses to present his federal claims
to the state court in the first instance . . . . Once the
defendant chooses to bypass the orderly procedure for litigating his constitutional claims . . . the State acquires a legitimate expectation of finality in the conviction thereby obtained. . . .It is in this sense, therefore, that ordinarily "a
guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has
preceded it in the criminal process.'""
Because New York had "chosen not to treat a guilty plea as such a
'break in the chain of events' with regard to certain types of constitutional claims," however, a defendant who had pleaded guilty in New
York would not be barred from asserting these claims in federal
habeas corpus.
Justice White's dissenting opinion objected that the majority had
seriously misread Tollett and the guilty-plea trilogy:
[N]either the petitioner in McMann nor the petitioner in
Tollett had "deliberately bypassed" state procedures for raising the coerced confession or grand jury discrimination claims
there involved. Indeed, the entire majority opinion rests on
the erroneous notion that we refused to hear antecedent con95.
96.
97.

N.Y. CRIM. PROC. L. §§ 710.20(1)-(3), 710.70(2).
420 U.S. 283 (1975).
Id. at 289.
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stitutional claims in McMann and Tollett because the
defendants had "bypassed" those claims by pleading guilty.
In fact, those decisions were based on the substantive proposition that the defendants' guilt in those cases, and the State's
consequent absolute right to incarcerate them, was established by their voluntary and intelligent pleas of guilty ...
Similarly, here, Newsome's guilt has been established by as
reliable a method as is known to the criminal law-his solemn
admission of guilt, made in open court."8
Justice White later reiterated the same theme even more forcefully:
[Tihe [majority's] contentions assume that the Brady trilogy
was based upon notions of waiver. In other words, it assumes
that this Court has in the past refused to set aside "guilty
pleas" on the basis of antecedent violations of constitutional
rights only because the plea was deemed to have "waived"
those rights. This assumption finds some support in the language of those cases, but waiver was not their basic ingredient. . . .[Flederal constitutional principles simply preclude
the setting aside of a state conviction by a federal court where
the defendant's guilt has been conclusively established by a
voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty. Labels aside, a guilty
plea for federal purposes is a judicial admission of guilt conclusively establishing a defendant's factual guilt. Newsome's
plea plainly qualifies."9
In McMann, Justice White had characterized a guilty plea as "a
waiver of the right to contest the admissibility of any evidence the
State might have offered against the defendant."''0 He had said that
if a defendant had pleaded guilty when he considered a crucial confession inadmissible, his plea was "nothing less than a refusal to present
his federal claims to the state court in the first instance."'' These
statements aside, Justice White could certainly have written a simpler
opinion in McMann if the analysis that he offered in Newsome had
indeed been decisive in the earlier case. There would have been no
need to discuss the inherent uncertainty that confronts defendants
and their counsel or to explore the significance of an attorney's mistaken strategic judgment. It would have been enough for the Court
to have said: "These defendants have solemnly admitted their guilt,
and that being so, we do not care what may have happened to them
98. Id. at 295-98 (footnotes omitted).
99. Id. at 299 (footnotes omitted).
100. 397 U.S. at 766.
101. Id.at 768.
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in the past. The whole purpose of criminal proceedings is to determine whether a defendant is guilty, and once that question is satisfactorily answered in the affirmative, the state's consequent right to
incarcerate the defendant is established absolutely."
Surely, however, Justice White and the other dissenters in
Newsome would recognize limitations on the view that guilt is all that
matters. Even a guilty defendant is entitled in some sense to "know
the score" before he is convicted on a plea of guilty. If, to take an
extreme example, a prosecutor or trial judge has deliberately misled
a defendant concerning the nature of the state's evidence or the sentence that would be imposed following a guilty plea, presumably
neither Justice White nor any other member of the Supreme Court
would dissent from the view that the resulting guilty-plea conviction
was invalid.' In this situation, the defendant's plea would provide
as reliable a demonstration of his guilt as if the official representations or promises had been true, but few would argue that, because
the defendant's guilt was clear, his conviction could not violate the
Federal Constitution. The state does not have a "consequent right to
incarcerate" a guilty defendant whose waiver of the right to trial has
been induced by official deception. Similarly, its right to incarcerate
a defendant whose plea has resulted from ignorance of the rights that
he would have enjoyed at trial requires greater demonstration than
Justice White offered in either Newsome or the guilty-plea trilogy.
Of course, no one suggests that an unattainable perfect knowledge is necessary before a defendant can enter a valid guilty plea. The
task of the Court in McMann and Tollett was to draw a line somewhere between perfect knowledge and official deception and to specify the extent to which even a guilty defendant is entitled to "know
the score" before waiving his right to trial. For that reason, it would
not have constituted an answer to the question raised by these cases
to have asserted very forcefully that the defendants' guilt had, after
all, been established. The question of waiver was inescapably presented by the cases, and in one form or another, the Court inevitably
answered it. Indeed, if guilt were all that mattered, it would be unclear why a defendant should be entitled even to reasonably competent legal advice in resolving the strategic issues that confront him in
choosing his plea. Nevertheless, the McMann and Tollett opinions
recognized that fairness, even to the guilty, requires some effort on
the part of the legal system to insure an awareness of constitutional
rights.
102.

See Santobello v. New York, 414 U.S. 257 (1971).
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Justice White's dissent in Newsome rested on the contention that
a bargained guilty plea conclusively establishes guilt-indeed, that it
establishes guilt "by as reliable a method as is known to the criminal
law." In a case like McMann, however, even if one discounts the view
that the ordinary pressures of the guilty-plea system are likely to
induce the innocent to plead guilty, it is difficult to have confidence
in the accuracy of defendants' pleas. The Supreme Court applied its
ruling in Jackson v. Denno retroactively because the New York procedure that permitted even an involuntary confession to come before
the jury threatened "the very integrity of the fact-finding process"
and posed a "clear danger of convicting the innocent."' 13 A defendant threatened with conviction at trial despite his innocence might
well have entered a bargained plea. He could have recognized that it
is better to be an innocent person on probation than an ifinocent
person in prison. Insofar as plea negotiation is a rational process that
reflects the probable outcome of a case at trial-that is, insofar as
the process conforms to the model articulated in McMann-unfair
procedures that affect the accuracy of the fact-finding process at trial
are likely to affect the accuracy of guilty-plea convictions as well. 104
Similarly, a defendant like the defendant in Parkerwho was unaware
that a coerced confession could have been excluded from evidence
might have been tempted to enter a bargained guilty plea despite his
innocence. The lack of a knowing waiver should itself give rise to
concern about the accuracy of a defendant's conviction when the right
that the defendant has unknowingly sacrificed is designed to guard
against the danger of wrongful conviction.
Of course not all constitutional rights are designed to promote
accurate verdicts at trial, and when a defendant has unknowingly
abandoned a right that serves some other purpose, his lack of knowledge does not provide reason to question the accuracy of his conviction. Nevertheless, this circumstance merely points to another difficulty inherent in Mr. Justice White's analysis. When a defendant who
has been convicted at trial is permitted to assert a right that is designed to promote fair law enforcement procedures rather than factually accurate verdicts, there plainly exists no reason to doubt his
factual guilt. The Supreme Court has not said that the state's "right
to incarcerate" such a defendant is established by his guilt alone but,
to the contrary, has allowed him to vindicate constitutional rights
103. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728 (1966), quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618, 639 (1965).
104. See Note, The Guilty Plea As a Waiver of "Present But Unknowable" Constitutional Rights: The Aftermath of the Brady Trilogy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1444 n.56 (1974).
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which serve values other than protection of the innocent. The
defendant in Newsome sought to assert a claim that heroin had been
unlawfully seized from his person, and, although his guilt had undoubtedly been clearly established, that fact did not distinguish his
case in any way from that of a defendant who had been convicted at
trial on the basis of illegally obtained evidence and who could concededly have presented his claim of unlawful seizure in a habeas corpus
proceeding. 105
Justice White adverted to this difficulty in a footnote:
[I]t may be argued that, unlike some other claims, Fourth
Amendment claims are not undercut by a guilty plea in which
guilt is solemnly admitted. The short answer to this argument
is that it applies as well in the case of States which do not
permit appeals from guilty pleas as in the case of those which
do, and the argument has therefore already been rejected.
Tollett . . .; Brady. . .; McMann. . . . More to the point,
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule should be furthered at the lowest possible cost to society in terms of freeing
the guilty. By precluding defendants who plead guilty from
litigating Fourth Amendment issues, we do not seriously detract from the deterrent purpose of the rule (a policeman
about to improperly invade someone's privacy can hardly rely
upon the erroneous pretrial denial of a suppression motion by
a trial judge and the defendant's mistaken decision to plead
guilty) and we avoid unnecessarily freeing the guilty.'"'
Surely, however, McMann and Tollett cannot be read as holding
that a guilty-plea defendant's factual guilt precludes him from asserting a fourth amendment claim. McMann, as Justice White recognized, frequently used the language of waiver; a defendant would
apparently be barred from asserting a fourth amendment claim, not
because his plea established his guilt, but because his competently
counseled guilty plea somehow reflected a knowing abandonment of
the claim. And Tollett's assertion that a guilty plea, although not a
waiver, was a "break in the chain of events which has preceded it"
was simply baffling. One could not have known that in a few short
sentences the Court had overruled sub silentio its many rulings that
guilt or innocence is irrelevant when a claim of unlawful seizure is
advanced. If McMann and Tollett had truly held as Justice White
contended, moreover, those decisions would have been plainly non105.
106.

See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
420 U.S. at 296 n.3 (emphasis in original).
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sensical, for the Court would not have offered the slightest distinction
between a guilty-plea defendant who was barred from asserting a
fourth amendment claim because of his undoubted guilt and a trial
defendant who was not barred from asserting a fourth amendment
claim because of his undoubted guilt.
Justice White argued that his position would "not seriously detract from the deterrent purpose of the [exclusionary] rule" because
a police officer could not anticipate both an erroneous pretrial ruling
and a mistaken decision to plead guilty, yet a policeman could surely
sense an incentive to violate the Constitution even when he could not
foresee the exact mechanism by which his violation of constitutional
rights might lead to a conviction. As I have written elsewhere, "An
officer should be discouraged from thinking, 'I know that it is probably illegal to enter this apartment, but the prosecutor may nevertheless be able to make something of the case. He seems able to get some
kind of guilty plea from almost every defendant, and I can therefore
be reasonably confident that the defendant will be convicted of
something.' "I07
Perhaps Justice White's view was simply that sufficient deterrence is provided when defendants who have been convicted at trial
are permitted to retain their fourth amendment rights. He may have
concluded that there was no need to extend the same privilege to
guilty-plea defendants. It could equally have been argued, however,
that sufficient deterrence would be provided if defendants who had
stood trial were precluded from asserting their fourth amendment
rights while guilty-plea defendants retained them or if blue-eyed defendants were allowed to test the constitutionality of police seizures
in habeas corpus proceedings while brown-eyed defendants were not.
This sort of analysis plainly would not have offered a principled
distinction between guilty-plea and trial defendants, and in any event,
the perception that unlawful action will be unproductive some of the
time would seem unlikely to deter police misconduct if, under rulings
like that suggested by Justice White in Newsome, the same unlawful
action would remain productive the rest of the time. Certainly nothing in Justice White's discussion suggests why, if it is the guilt of
guilty-plea defendants that precludes them from asserting fourth
amendment claims, the same consideration does not apply with equal
force to defendants who have exercised the right to trial.
It bears reiteration that although Justice White's position in
Newsome attracted four votes, it was unmistakably rejected by a
107.
(1968).

Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L.
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majority of the Court. The majority continued to regard a guilty plea,
not simply as an admission of guilt, but as a waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights that must in some sense be knowing. Moreover,
the majority read McMann and Tollett as embodying this theory of
waiver. The analysis in this article has considered the Supreme
Court's decisions in these terms, although I do of course agree with
Mr. Justice White's recently developed and rather startling position
that his opinions in the guilty-plea trilogy are indefensible in terms
of traditional waiver concepts.
C. The Merits and Demerits of the Knowing Waiver Concept:
Striking a Reasonable Balance
Underlying Tollett and the guilty-plea trilogy is the basic question whether the Supreme Court should adhere to its traditional concept of waiver as an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right or privilege."'' 0 The Court said in Tollett, "A guilty
plea voluntarily and intelligently entered may not be vacated because
the defendant was not advised of every conceivable constitutional
plea in abatement he might have to the charge . . . ," and in a
similar case, the Fifth Circuit raised the prospect that a defense
attorney might be required to give each of his clients a course in
constitutional law before permitting him to plead guilty."10 In his
Tollett dissent, Mr. Justice Marshall maintained that this imagery
exaggerated the practical problems that continued insistence upon the
requirement of a knowing waiver would involve: the number of potential constitutional violations at issue in an individual case is ordinarily
small, and a defense attorney can reasonably be expected to investigate these potential violations and to advise the defendant of his
options."'
Moreover, whatever practical difficulties insistence upon a
knowing waiver might present, the Supreme Court seemed at most
to suggest the incompatibility of this traditional requirement and the
guilty-plea system. The Court may have implied that a guilty plea
waives so many constitutional rights that it would be impractical or
even impossible for a defendant to consider and knowingly relinquish
them all. On its face, such a proposition seems to argue as much for
abandonment of the guilty-plea system as for abandonment of the
requirement of a knowing waiver. Indeed, the presumption might be
108.
109.
110.
111.

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
411 U.S. at 267.
Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174, 181 (5th Cir. 1973).
411 U.S. at271-72.
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that our practices should be molded to fit constitutional ideals rather
than our ideals molded to fit current practices.
Nevertheless, the problem of waiver is more complex than an
unyielding insistence upon the requirement of a knowing choice may
make it seem. Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr., of the Maryland Court
of Special Appeals has written:
The only thing that can be said about constitutional waiver
in the abstract is that nothing can be said about constitutional
waiver in the abstract. It is as protean in its manifestations
as the number of constitutional rights which there are to be
waived multiplied by the number of circumstances in which
they may be waived. . . . Even a partial cataloguing of its
applications illustrates the breadth of the spectrum through
which it vacillates-operating at times with fastidious forbearance, at times blithely and summarily, and frequently
with coquettish inconstancy."'
On one side of the problem, a defendant who has no knowledge
of a right cannot honestly be said to abandon it by consent, and to
deprive a defendant of a right that he has had no realistic opportunity
to exercise is always unfair. If constitutional rights are to be meaningful, they must be known, understood, and exercised. Accordingly, a
decent legal system should strive to insure an awareness of legal
rights whatever their content; to capitalize deliberately upon a
defendant's ignorance of his rights is never a legitimate device for
obtaining criminal convictions."'
At the same time, the state has a legitimate interest in bringing
litigation to an end. In a legal system with unlimited resources, courts
might always remain open to new proceedings in which defendants
could assert rights that they had not knowingly abandoned in the
past. An affluent society might refuse to balance the benefits of justice to the defendant against the high cost of providing it through as
many proceedings as might be necessary. The Supreme Court's habeas corpus decisions have, in fact, come close to endorsing this
view." 4 In our current system of justice, however (a system that is too
miserly to give most defendants trials at the time of their convictions), this policy seems hypocritical. To pressure most defendants
into sacrificing their initial and primary opportunity for a hearing
112. Miller v. Warden, 16 Md. App. 614, 615, 299 A.2d 862, 863 (1973).
113. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
114. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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and then to afford unfettered access to the judicial system for repeated post-conviction proceedings seems a bizarre allocation of resources.
Apart from the problem of resources, a defendant's delay in the

assertion of his rights almost invariably prejudices the prosecution.
The state cannot effectively conduct a trial years after the event when
critical witnesses have forgotten, died, or disappeared. Of course the

state's obligation is to convict a defendant fairly or not at all, and,
by hypothesis, a defendant is prepared to demonstrate-belatedly

-that his conviction was unfair. Nevertheless, the state has a legitimate interest in requiring a defendant's prompt assertion of his
rights-so that it can, in fact, conduct a fair trial at a time when it is
possible to do so. Although it is always harsh to deprive a defendant
of a right that he has had no realistic opportunity to exercise, sub-

stantial countervailing interests may sometimes require this result." 5
In striking the balance in an individual case, a number of considerations may become relevant. One is the character of the right that
the defendant has asserted. A court which permits the belated asser-

tion of a crucial individual right (for example, the right to counsel)
need not automatically permit the assertion of a right that seems
largely designed to vindicate the interests of persons other than the
defendant himself (for example, the right to indictment by a properly

selected grand jury). "' Another relevant factor is the severity of the
sanction that the trial court has imposed. In the capital case, for
example, courts might reasonably afford the defendant every possible
opportunity to demonstrate defects in the process that produced his
conviction; the sacrifice of procedural regularity might seem unimportant when the stakes are so high.
115. For a more complete listing of the interests served by the doctrine of finality in
criminal cases, see Amsterdam, Search, Seizure and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA.
L. REV. 378, 383-84 (1964).
116. One might be tempted to read this discussion in terms of the controversy about
whether federal habeas corpus should be available to test a defendant's claim that evidence used
against him in a state court was seized in violation of the Constitution. Compare Kaufman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969), with Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring). I therefore emphasize that the discussion in text concerns the general
problem of finality uncomplicated by special problems of federalism. Under our federal system,
a litigant should ordinarily be able to secure an adjudication of his federal claims in a federal
forum, and this policy may argue for a departure from what would otherwise be sound principles of finality. But see Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners,76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963). Even after a criminal defendant has fully adjudicated
his federal claims in state-court proceedings, for example, it might be desirable to afford him
access to a federal forum as a matter of right. But cf Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963);
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970) (state-court fact-finding ordinarily "presumed correct" in federal
habeas corpus proceedings).

HeinOnline -- 47 U. Colo. L. Rev. 39 1975-1976

40

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

Finally, a court should examine why the defendant did not assert
the right in question at the earliest opportunity. At one extreme might
be a case in which the defendant deliberately chose to invite error or
to circumvent the orderly administration of justice-a classic case of
waiver. At the other extreme might be a case in which both the
defendant and his attorney were justifiably unaware of the right and
of the possibility of asserting it, as when the right effectively came
into existence as the result of a retroactively applied Supreme Court
decision after the time of trial. The variety of intermediate situations
seems almost unlimited. For example:
The well-educated defendant had every opportunity to assert
the right in question but failed to do so; his bypass of orderly
trial procedures, although not deliberate, was at least
negligent.
The defendant's attorney made a deliberate, intelligent decision to forego the right but did not involve the defendant in
the choice. This failure might, in some circumstances, be explained by the fact that consultation with the defendant would
have interrupted the progress of an ongoing trial; in other
circumstances, however, a reasonable attorney would have
informed the defendant of his options.
The defendant himself decided to forego the right but only
because of significant pressure. Perhaps the defendant decided not to exercise the right to appeal because-under practices since declared unconstitutional' 7-reversal might have
resulted in a new trial and a death sentence." 8 Or perhaps the
defendant decided not to challenge the exclusion of blacks
from a trial jury because this action would have produced
hostility on the part of the white jurors ultimately included in
the panel." 9
This cursory examination of only some of the relevant factors
suggests the complexity of the problem-a problem that does not
yield to the Supreme Court's assertion that "a guilty plea represents
a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal
process." Perhaps, in a legal system very different from ours, guilty
pleas could indeed be viewed as blanket waivers of unknown rights.
A guilty-plea defendant could fairly be regarded as saying, "I do not
care what defenses I may have to the charge. As a matter of consci117.
118.
119.

See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-40 (1963).
See Whitus v. Balkcom, 333 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964).
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ence, I wish to accept the punishment prescribed for this offense." In
our legal system, however, guilty pleas are usually entered as a matter
of tactics, not conscience. Guilty-plea defendants do care what defenses they may have to the charges against them, and a guilty plea

entered in ignorance of a right is no more a waiver of that right than
is a failure to assert the right at trial.
In some circumstances, despite the lack of a knowing waiver,
courts might hold that a defendant should be precluded from assert-

ing a right on the ground that his attempt to assert it came too late.
This conclusion should rest, however, on a balance of the costs and
benefits of affording relief despite the defendant's delay in seeking it;
a plea of guilty should not be determinative. Indeed, most of the

factors that seem relevant in deciding when post-conviction remedies
should be available are independent of whether the defendant has
pleaded guilty or failed to assert a defense at trial.

When the existence of a bargained plea seems relevant, moreover, it may argue for liberality in allowing the defendant to assert
claims that he has unknowingly failed to present in the past. In

Parker and Tollett, defendants ignorant of their rights yielded to
substantial inducements to forego hearings of any kind. Their position may seem stronger than that of a defendant who was afforded
every opportunity to present his defenses but who, through ignorance,

failed to do so. To say, as the Supreme Court has, that defendants
who have enjoyed one opportunity to assert their rights have a
stronger claim on the attention of the courts than defendants who
have been pressured to forego any opportunity seems to turn things

upside down. "'
120. 1 can think of only one situation in which the existence of a bargained plea might
argue against allowing a defendant to raise a claim of which he was ignorant at the time of his
conviction. A defendant convicted at trial might be allowed to assert a procedural right belatedly because the denial of this right could have affected the accuracy of the fact-finding process
and resulted in the conviction of an innocent person. A defendant convicted on a plea of guilty
might be foreclosed from asserting this right on the theory that his plea eliminated any significant doubt concerning the accuracy of his conviction. See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S.
283, 294 (1975) (White, J., dissenting), and text accompanying notes 95-107 supra.
Of course this approach would be justified only when the reason for permitting the belated
assertion of a right was to insure the accuracy of a defendant's conviction, and even then, the
approach would present substantial dangers. As I have argued above in greater detail, see text
accompanying notes 103-04 supra, a defendant threatened with conviction at trial despite his
innocence might be tempted to enter a bargained guilty plea.
Although the Supreme Court has often focused on the extent to which a procedural right
affects "the integrity of the truth-determining process" in deciding whether the right should be
retroactively applied, e.g., Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971); Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 523 n.22 (1968), 1 doubt
that the danger of convicting the innocent has in fact substantially motivated the Court's
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D. The PracticalSignificance of the Court's Substitution of a
Competency of Counsel Standardfor the Requirement of a Knowing
Waiver: A Note on the Supreme Court's Strategy
In the guilty-plea trilogy and in Tollett, the Supreme Court
maintained that it had not departed from the traditional rule that a
guilty plea, to be valid, must be "a knowing and intelligent act."
Rather, the Court's view was that a "plea of guilty based on reasonably competent advice is an intelligent plea."'' As I have indicated, 2 '
a knowing waiver can properly be equated with a competently counseled waiver when one adopts a strict enough standard of competence.
With this qualification, however, the Supreme Court's proposition
seems relatively unimportant. The equation of two constitutional
decisions. The violation of a constitutional right-even a very fundamental right-usually does
not so alter the nature of the trial process as to give rise to substantial doubt concerning the
defendant's guilt. Especially when the right in question is a newly articulated right that was
not considered essential to a fair trial a few months earlier, the claim that a unanimous jury
verdict might have been inaccurate is likely to seem unpersuasive.
Were the Supreme Court's concern limited to the danger of convicting the innocent, the
logical course would be to ask whether, in light of the evidence in the case, there was truly any
chance that the defendant might have been inaccurately convicted. The Court has not adopted
this approach but has asked only whether "the major purpose of a new constitutional doctrine
is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial which substantially impairs its truth-finding
function." Williams v. United States, supra, at 653. Thus the Court would plainly grant
retroactive relief to a defendant who had been denied a right designed to promote accurate
verdicts even if a dozen bishops had witnessed his crime and the defendant had voluntarily
confessed. Ironically, when newly discovered evidence suggests that a defendant convicted in a
federal court might, in fact, be innocent, federal judges have usually been reluctant to grant
relief. In such a case the defendant must show that the recently discovered evidence would
probably lead to an acquittal, and even this showing of probable innocence is not necessarily
enough. See, e.g., United States v. Rachal, 473 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
927 (1973). Moreover, newly discovered evidence suggesting the innocence of a defendant
convicted in a state court, no matter how persuasive, does not supply a basis for federal habeas
corpus relief. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963).
Through a purportedly neutral analysis of the purpose of a right, the Supreme Court has
largely masked the determinative inquiry-how important the right is to the Court's sense that
the defendant, whether guilty or innocent, was fairly treated. Contra, Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U.S. 719, 728 (1966) ("the choice between retroactivity and nonretroactivity in no way
turns on the value of the constitutional guarantee involved").
Constitutional rights are not fungible, and there are various levels of injustice. The injustice
that warrants relief when a defendant has asserted a right promptly and when a fair retrial is
possible may not be sufficient when assertion of the right has been delayed; the balance of cost
and benefit does not remain the same. A frank recognition of the inevitability of a subjective
judgment concerning the importance of a right would probably aid analysis. Were this approach
adopted, however, there would be no basis for a distinction between defendants who have
pleaded guilty and defendants who have been convicted at trial. The question in every case
would be whether a violation of constitutional rights could have rendered the defendant's
conviction so unfair as to justify belated litigation of the issue.
121. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970).
122. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
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doctrines matters little when the two doctrines are in fact equivalent.

In this situation the underlying problem might be approached as
easily through one route as through the other. The Supreme Court's
rulings in Tollett and the guilty-plea trilogy make it plain, however,
that the Court was not engaged in a purely academic exercise. Despite

the logical similarity of the two concepts, it makes a great practical
difference whether a court approaches a question of waiver in terms
of the competence of counsel or in terms of the knowing quality of a
defendant's choice.
When the issue is described as the competence of counsel, a court

is apparently required to make an ad hominem judgment about a
member of the bar. When a court asks about the knowing quality of
a defendant's choice, it focuses directly on his state of mind and can

thereby avoid, or at least mute, any intimation of professional insult.
In practice, judges tend to close ranks when members of the legal
profession are threatened, and partly for this reason, courts have
usually defined the right to the effective assistance of counsel in
narrow terms. Although some courts have articulated more generous

standards in the period since the guilty-plea trilogy was decided,'
most courts refuse relief on grounds of ineffective legal assistance
unless the proceedings were "a farce, and a mockery of justice."',4
123. See Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974) ("counsel reasonably
likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance"); United States v. DeCoster, 487
F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("a defendant is entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent conscientious advocate") (emphasis in original); West
v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026, 1033 (5th Cir. 1973) (counsel "reasonably likely to render and
rendering reasonably effective assistance") (emphasis in original); Moore v. United States, 432
F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970) ("legal services of the same level of competency as that generally
afforded at the bar to fee-paying clients"); State v. Thomas, 203 S.E.2d 445, 461 (W. Va. 1974)
(counsel exhibiting "the normal and customary skills possessed by attorneys who are reasonably knowledgeable of criminal law").
124. See, e.g., Brown v. Swenson, 487 F.2d 1236, 1240 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 944 (1974); United States v. Callison, 408 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 945 (1970); Nutt v. United States, 335 F.2d 817 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909
(1964); People v. Washington, 41 III. 2d 16, 241 N.E.2d 425 (1968). See also Finer, Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 1077, 1078 (1973); Grano, The Right to Counsel:
Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1175, 1241 (1970); Lee, Right to
Effective Counsel: A Judicial Heuristic, 2 AM. J. CRIM. L. 277, 289 (1974); Palmer, Incompetency and Inadequacy of Counsel as a Basis for Relief in Federal Habeas Corpus
Proceedings, 20 Sw. L.J. 136, 138-39 (1966); Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 289, 30304 (1964).
Chief Judge David L. Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has said that most courts are "papering over the problem of inadequate
assistance" and that the mockery-of-justice test "is itself a mockery of the sixth amendment."
Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 28 (1973).
Some courts have said that a lawyer's representation is ineffective only when it is the

HeinOnline -- 47 U. Colo. L. Rev. 43 1975-1976

44

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

As Judge Arnold Bauman has observed, "the 'shock the conscience
test' . . . appears to survive unimpaired in this remote pocket of
constitutional law."' 6 The Supreme Court's guilty-plea trilogy
tended, if anything, to reinforce this narrow view of the defendant's
constitutional right to counsel. The Court sometimes said that the
defense attorney's advice must be "competent,"'2 6 sometimes that it
must be "reasonably competent,""' sometimes that it must be
"within the range of competence required of attorneys representing
defendants in criminal cases,"'2 8 and sometimes that it must not reflect "serious derelictions"'' 9 or "gross error."' 30
The character of the constitutional doctrine that the McMann
opinion made determinative in guilty-plea cases becomes apparent
when one examines the tenor of specific lower-court rulings on the
effectiveness of counsel. For example, Warren E. Burger, then a
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, wrote in 1958:
Mere improvident strategy, bad tactics, mistake, carelessness
or inexperience do not necessarily amount to ineffective assistance of counsel, unless taken as a whole the trial was a
"mockery of justice." The specific allegations here are that
counsel met with appellant only once, and at that time told
him "there is nothing I can do for you," which, appellant
alleges, "shows that counsel never considered weighting [sic]
the facts in said case, nor due consideration for preparation
for trial." Also counsel "deluded" appellant into believing
there was nothing to do but plead guilty ....
But there was much counsel might have done, appellant
now tells us. Counsel might have argued the illegality of the
arrest and might have moved to suppress evidence obtained
by illegal search and seizure, and illegal confessions. We
agree that counsel might have done these things . . . but we
do not agree that failure to do so was such ineffective assistance of counsel as to warrant a new trial.'
equivalent of no representation at all. See Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957);
McGee v. Crouse, 190 Kan. 615, 618, 376 P.2d 792, 795 (1962); Smith v. Woodley, 164 N.W.2d
594, 597 (N.D. 1969).
125. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Vincent, 370 F. Supp. 379, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
126. 397 U.S. at 754.
127. Id. at 770.
128. Id. at 771.
129. Id. at 774.
130. Id. at 772.
131. Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707, 708-09 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
847 (1958).
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After this general description of the limits of the right to the
effective assistance of counsel, Judge Burger's opinion concluded that
a distinction should be drawn between cases in which defendants have
pleaded guilty and cases in which they have exercised the right to
trial:
It must be realized that this is not a case in which proof
of guilt depended upon a trial. In such cases, the accused
usually relies to a great extent on counsel to conduct an effective defense, because the accused does not know enough of the
law to do so himself. .

.

. But this is not so when he pleads

guilty. Here the deed is his own; here there are not the baffling
complexities which require a lawyer for illumination; if voluntarily and understandingly made, even a layman should expect a plea of guilty to be treated as an honest confession of
guilt and a waiver of all defenses known and unknown ...
Certainly ineffective assistance of counsel, as opposed to ignorance of the right to counsel, is immaterial in an attempt
to impeach a plea of guilty, except perhaps to the extent that
it bears on the issues of voluntariness and understanding.
• . . [The appellant has alleged that] counsel's "bad"
advice induced him to plead guilty. This, however, does not
itself make out involuntariness. It seems likewise clear that
the plea was understandingly made. It may be argued that a
plea is not understandingly made when defendant is unaware
of certain technical defenses which might very well make the
prosecutor's job more difficult or even impossible were he put
to his proof. However, we think "understandingly" refers
merely to the meaning of the charge, and what acts amount
to being guilty of the charge, and the consequences of pleading guilty thereto, rather than to dilatory or evidentiary defenses. .

.

. Appellant

. .

. pleads only that, unknown to him,

he might have been able to suppress the truth as to certain
evidence of his crime, and thus perhaps defeat justice." 2
It is remarkable that Judge Burger viewed Bill of Rights safeguards
as "dilatory defenses," "technical defenses," and "mechanisms for
defeating justice." It is also remarkable that, in approaching guiltyplea cases, Judge Burger should have considered voluntariness and
understanding determinative and the effectiveness of counsel imma132. Id. at 709-10 (emphasis in original). For a discussion of the merits of Judge Burger's
distinction between guilty-plea cases and trial cases, see Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's
Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1267-68 (1975).
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terial until, by joining the Supreme Court's opinions in Tollett and
the guilty-plea trilogy, he endorsed the opposite view that effective
legal assistance is the only significant issue in the guilty-plea case.13
A more striking illustration of the reluctance of some judges to

sustain claims of ineffective assistance-especially after guilty
pleas-was provided by two decisions of the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals in 1970. In Ex parte Perry,134 the defense attorney, a man
of advanced age and failing eyesight, "did not have the opportunity

to-brief and keep abreast with the current law,"'' 3 and as a result,
he was appointed only in cases in which guilty pleas seemed likely.
In the case before the court, the attorney had conferred with his client
for no more than three to five minutes. He had told the client that
"if [the client] had signed a confession, he might as well plead

guilty."'' 3 The court remarked, "This is much like the case of
McMann v. Richardson, ' 13 and it unanimously reversed a trial
judge's finding that the defendant had been denied the effective assistance of counsel.
The second case, Ex parte Black, 38 involved an appointed attorney who had never appeared in a contested civil or criminal case but

who seemed to represent guilty-plea defendants with great frequency.
On the day of the defendant's plea of guilty to a capital crime, for
example, the attorney appeared in nine other felony cases and entered

guilty pleas in all of them. Several of this attorney's prior clients had
been awarded new trials and released soon after his "representation"
was concluded. In one case, for example, on a day when the attorney
had entered only five other guilty pleas, he had entered a plea for a
133. Of course the equation of a competently counseled guilty plea, on the one hand, and
a knowing and voluntary plea, on the other, can be twisted in either direction. If, as in Parker,
it seems clear that a defendant has not knowingly waived his rights, a court may obscure the
issue by saying, "But the advice that he received was well within the range of competence
required of attorneys representing defendants in criminal cases." If, however, a defendant has
been denied the effective assistance of counsel, a court may obscure the issue by saying, "But
the defendant pleaded guilty knowingly and voluntarily." See, e.g., Dukes v. Warden, 161
Conn. 337, 343-44, 388 A.2d 58, 61-62 (1971), affd, 406 U.S. 250 (1972):
Even assuming, arguendo, that there was a denial of the effective assistance of
counsel . . . , the only question in this regard presented by this appeal is whether
the conflict rendered the plea involuntary and unintelligent. . . . [A] claim of the
ineffective assistance of counsel due to an alleged conflict of interest, standing alone,
is not sufficient to call the validity of a guilty plea and the judgment of conviction
based thereon into question.
134. 455 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
135. Id. at 215.
136. Id. at 216.
137. Id.
138. 457 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
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defendant who was less than seventeen years old and not subject to
the trial court's jurisdiction.
In the case before the court, the attorney had entered a guilty
plea to capital murder on the same day that he was appointed. The
attorney testified that he had advised the defendant of the charge
against him, but he had apparently not discussed with the defendant
the facts of the case. At the conclusion of a post-conviction hearing,
a trial court found that the attorney had "made substantially no
investigation of the facts . . . or of the law applicable to the
facts."' 9
The attorney waived the statutory right to a ten-day delay in
which to prepare for trial; he waived the right to one day's advance
notice of the members of the panel from which the jury that would
sentence the defendant would be selected; and he waived the right to
a 36-person jury panel in a capital case. The defendant's jury consisted of the first twelve persons summoned by the sheriff. The trial
judge charged this jury that it could sentence the defendant to death.
The defense attorney's most notable error occurred during the
proceedings before the jury. The attorney raised no objection when
the court charged the jurors that the defendant had previously been
convicted of a capital offense and that they could consider this fact
in assessing punishment. In fact, the defendant's prior conviction was
not final and was inadmissible for any purpose. Again the Court of
Criminal Appeals, on this occasion over the dissent of Judge W. A.
Morrison, reversed a trial judge's determination that the defendant
had been denied the effective assistance of counsel. The court cited
only the guilty-plea trilogy in support of its position.
It would plainly be improper to attribute to the Supreme Court
all of the outrageous things that lower courts have done in the name
of its decisions. These Texas rulings are concededly extreme, and it
is doubtful they would have met with approval in the Supreme
Court. 40 These decisions nevertheless suggest the background of hostility to claims of ineffective legal assistance against which the guiltyplea trilogy was written. The Supreme Court did not make it harder
for courts like the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to insulate
guilty-plea justice from meaningful judicial review.
In an effectiveness-of-counsel case, a defendant bears a heavy
burden even when he has stood trial and when the courtroom performance of his attorney is a matter of record. In a guilty-plea case,
139. Id. at 923 (Morrison, J., dissenting from denial of motion for rehearing).
140. Indeed, the defendant in Black ultimately secured relief on federal habeus corpus.
Black v. Beto, 327 F. Supp. 1405 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
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the defendant's burden is multiplied. A defense attorney's bargaining
sessions with prosecutors are not public, and neither are the attorney's conferences with his client. It is extraordinarily difficult for a
court to learn the facts of a particular case, and it is also difficult to
know what should be expected of an attorney in an unstructured
bargaining situation. Even if courts were to evaluate allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel without hostility and bias, the Supreme Court's formula would insure that relief from a guilty-plea
conviction would remain a rare event.
Whatever the logic of the Supreme Court's reasoning in the
guilty-plea trilogy, the Court plainly had a choice. One alternative
was to analyze the validity of guilty pleas in traditional terms by
asking whether each plea reflected an understanding relinquishment
of the defendant's rights. Another was to shift the inquiry by asking
whether the defendant had been competently advised by his attorney.
The Court chose the less developed doctrine and the doctrine that
tends to reduce the inquiry to ad hominem terms. The three Justices
who dissented in McMann maintained that the Court had deliberately made this choice on tactical grounds. "Despite the disclaimers
to the contrary," they said, "what is essentially involved . . . is nothing less than the determination of the Court to preserve the sanctity
of virtually all judgments obtained by means of guilty pleas."''

III.

Brady v. United States

AND THE REQUIREMENT OF A

VOLUNTARY WAIVER

A.

The Court's Opinion
In Brady v. United States,' the remaining case of the trilogy,
the defendant was charged with a capital crime-transporting a kidnap victim in interstate commerce and failing to liberate her unharmed.'
The Federal Kidnapping Act provided, however, that
death could be inflicted only after conviction by a jury. If the defendant pleaded guilty or waived his right to jury trial, the statute authorized a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Confronted with
this scheme and with the trial court's refusal to consider a jury-waived
trial, the defendant pleaded guilty. It was assumed for purposes of
decision that the defendant's fear of the death penalty had significantly influenced his choice.
In 1968, following the defendant's conviction, the Supreme
141. 397
the Citadel, 84
142. 397
143. Act

U.S. at 786. See Tigar, Forward,Waiver of ConstitutionalRights: Disquiet in
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1970).
U.S. 742 (.1970).
of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 760.
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Court held the penalty scheme of the Kidnapping Act unconstitutional. The Court said in United States v. Jackson'4 4 that this scheme
unfairly encouraged guilty pleas and needlessly penalized assertion of
the right to jury trial. The Court later applied its ruling retroactively-to defendants who had stood trial and had been sentenced to
death under similar schemes prior to the Jackson decision.' Relying
on Jackson, the defendant in Brady sought relief from his guilty-plea
conviction.
Mr. Justice White's opinion for the Supreme Court concluded
that Jackson had "neither fashioned a new standard for judging the
validity of guilty pleas nor mandated a new application of the test
theretofore fashioned by courts . . . that guilty pleas are valid if both
'voluntary' and 'intelligent.' "I" The Court held that the failure of the
defendant and his counsel to anticipate the ruling in United States v.
Jackson did not render the defendant's plea unintelligent.' 47 The remaining issue was that of voluntariness.
The Brady opinion recognized that, had the defendant chosen to
plead not guilty and face a trial before a jury, his decision might have
cost him his life. Still, the Court said:
Often the decision to plead guilty is heavily influenced by the
defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case against him
and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a
guilty plea be offered and accepted. Considerations like these
frequently present imponderable questions for which there are
no certain answers .... 148
The voluntariness of the defendant's plea could be determined
"only by considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding
it."' 4 One of these circumstances was that the defendant had been
"represented by competent counsel throughout" ""-a fact that the
Court reiterated at several points in its opinion. The Court maintained that the defendant "had competent counsel and full opportun144. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
145. Pope v. United States, 392 U.S. 651 (1968). Although the defendant in Pope had
not been convicted under the same statute as the defendant in Jackson, the constitutional defect
of both statutes was the same. The Government conceded in Brady that a defendant sentenced
to death under either statute would be entitled to retroactive relief. Brief for the United States
at 8, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
146. 397 U.S. at 747.
147. Id. at 756-58. The Court's analysis of this issue largely duplicated its analysis in
McMann.
148. Id. at 756.
149. Id. at 749.
150. Id. at 743.
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ity to assess the advantages and disadvantages of a trial as compared
with those attending a plea of guilty . . . ."I" There was no evidence
that the defendant "was so gripped by fear of the death penalty...
that he did not or could not, with the help of counsel, rationally weigh
the advantages of going to trial against the advantages of pleading
guilty."'5 Although the Court did evaluate the merits and dangers of
granting leniency to guilty-plea defendants in general terms,' it
plainly attached special significance to the presence of counsel.
The weight that the Court gave to the presence of counsel became especially apparent in its discussion of Brain v. United States,",
an 1897 Supreme Court decision. Bram had held that an out-of-court
confession could not be received in evidence unless it was "free and
voluntary: that is, . . not . . extracted by any sort of threats or
violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however
slight ..
."'I' The defendant's admission of guilt in Brady had, of
course, been obtained by a promise that was more than slight: The
Kidnapping Act assured him that his guilty plea would preclude the
infliction of capital punishment. The Supreme Court distinguished
Bran, however, primarily on the ground that the defendant in that
case had confessed without the advice of counsel. The Court said:
Bran dealt with a confession given by a defendant in custody,
alone and unrepresented by counsel. In such circumstances,
even a mild promise of leniency was deemed sufficient to bar
the confession, not because the promise was an illegal act as
such, but because defendants at such times are too sensitive
to inducement and the possible impact on them too great to
ignore and too difficult to assess. But Bram and its progeny
did not hold that the possibly coercive impact of a promise
of leniency could not be dissipated by the presence and advice
of counsel . . .."
The three Justices who dissented in McMann also dissented from
the majority's analysis in Brady, although they did concur in the
Court's result.'57 These Justices noted that the majority had read the
151.

Id. at 754.

152.

Id. at 750. But cf. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (Holmes, J.)

("Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife.").
153. 397 U.S. at 751-53. From my perspective, the Court's general evaluation of plea
bargaining was far from persuasive. Discussion of this portion of the Court's opinion would,
however, carry this Article far from its central theme.
154. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
155. Id. at 542-43.
156. 397 U.S. at 754.
157. 397 U.S. at 799 (Brennan, J., dissenting in Parker v. North Carolina, and concurring in Brady). For a discussion of the ground of the concurrence in Brady, see note 186 infra.
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decision in United States v. Jackson to stand for a nonsensical proposition: a federal statute was unconstitutional because it encouraged
guilty pleas that were perfectly valid. The statute exerted an unconstitutional influence, but defendants who had yielded to this pressure
were not entitled to relief. Only defendants who had resisted the
unconstitutional influence could have their sentences set aside. 5"
B. A Problem of Craftsmanship: The Court's Treatment of Bram
v. United States and the Analogy to Out-of-Court Confessions
As the dissenting Justices demonstrated, the Brady opinion
undid in large measure a decision that the Court had announced only
two years before. What may be less apparent is that Brady also
effectively overruled almost 200 years of confession law." 9 Brain v.
United States was not the first decision to adopt the rule that a
confession must not be "obtained by any direct or implied promises,
however slight."' 0 In 1896, for example, in Wilson v. United
States,'' the Supreme Court said that a confession would be "inadmissible if made under any threat, promise, or encouragement of any
hope or favor."' 2 The Court added, "the true test of admissibility is
that the confession is made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort."' 3 Similarly, in an 1884 decision,
Hopt v. Utah,"4 the Court said that a confession, to be voluntary,
must be "uninfluenced by hope of reward or fear of punishment."' 65
It explained:
[Tihe presumption upon which weight is given to
[confessions], namely, that one who is innocent will not
imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement, ceases when the confession appears to have been made
either in consequence of inducements of a temporal nature,
held out by one in authority, touching the charge preferred,
or because of a threat or promise by or in the presence of such
person ....
158. Id.
159. When critics have suggested that the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Burger
might retreat from some of the Court's decisions under Chief Justice Warren, they have
underestimated the power of the Court's imagination. See also Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426
(1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) (discussed at notes 53-69 supra).
160. 168 U.S. at 542-43.
161. 162 U.S. 613 (1896).
162. Id. at 622.
163. Id. at 623.
164. 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
165. Id. at 584.
166. Id. at 585.

HeinOnline -- 47 U. Colo. L. Rev. 51 1975-1976

52

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

The rule that the Supreme Court reiterated in these cases was, indeed,
at least as old as a 1783 English decision which had held inadmissible
any confession obtained "by promises of favour." 1 67 Thus, when the
Brady opinion declared that United States v. Jackson had "neither
fashioned a new standard for judging the validity of guilty pleas nor
mandated a new application of the test theretofore fashioned by
courts," it spoke the truth.
Because the rule historically applied in evaluating out-of-court
confessions would, once extended to guilty pleas, render all bargained
pleas invalid, some observers have searched for distinctions between
guilty pleas and confessions. For example, Chief Judge Joseph C.
Hutcheson of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit once wrote:
[T]he dissenters fall into the fatal basic error of declaring, in
the teeth of the authorities . . . , that a plea of guilty is the
same as an extra judicial confession of guilt and is to be
regarded and dealt with in accordance with the rules governing confessions . . . .[T]he exact contrary of this is true. A
plea of guilty is not a confession; it is a conviction.6 '
The fact that a guilty plea "isa conviction" while a confession,
however incriminating, is merely evidence does not suggest that guilty
pleas should be governed by more lenient standards than confessions.
To the contrary, that "a confession only wounds while a guilty plea
kills"' 69 seems all the more reason to insure that the guilty plea is
voluntary. The only authority upon which Chief Judge Hutcheson
relied, the Supreme Court's opinion in Kercheval v. United States,7 0
seemed to make exactly that point. In Kercheval, the Court distinguished guilty pleas from "mere" extra-judicial confessions, and the
Court advanced this distinction to support its conclusion that "a plea
of guilty shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after proper
advice and with full understanding of the consequences."'' The other
distinctions that legal scholars have advanced between guilty pleas
167. Rex v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (Cr. Cas. 1783).
168. Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 576 (5th Cir. 1957) (Hutcheson, C.J.,
concurring), rev'dper curiam on confession of error, 356 U.S. 26 (1958) (emphasis in original).
169. Amsterdam, Address to the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, November, 1967 (unpublished).
170. 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
171. Id. at 223. See also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 & n.4 (1969) ("A plea
of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a
conviction . . . . It supplies both evidence and verdict, ending the controversy."); United States
ex rel. Codarre v. Gilligan, 363 F.2d 961, 966 (2d Cir. 1966) ("The entry of a plea of guilty
demands even more stringent safeguards than are required for confession.").
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and out-of-court confessions seem equally unpersuasive,"' and it is
172. One commentator once distinguished guilty pleas from confessions by saying:
A confession is an averment that certain facts occurred, and is used as evidence in a
fact-finding proceeding-trial-whose whole purpose is to determine whether the
facts actually occurred. The nature of the trial proceeding requires that consideration
be given to evidence. . . only to the extent that it has probative value. On the other
hand, the guilty plea is not necessarily an admission that the defendant engaged in a
criminal incident, but is a conclusion that there is sufficient evidence for a judge or
jury to find that he did so.
Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Pleas of Guilty, I12 U.
PA. L. REV. 865, 884 (1964).
This argument seems to rest on the proposition that courts should not be reluctant to
convict innocent defendants on their pleas of guilty. If that is not the contention, it is hard to
understand why reliability should be important only in cases involving out-of-court confessions-or why a court need not be concerned with whether a guilty plea, which serves as a
complete substitute for proof, has "probative value."
Although the requirement of voluntariness was originally justified on the ground that it
tended to insure the reliability of confessions, the Supreme Court has recognized that this
rationale can no longer be persuasive in a day when courts exclude plainly trustworthy evidence
obtained as the "fruit" of involuntary confessions. See Rogers v. Richman, 365 U.S. 534
(1961). The basic purpose of the requirement of voluntariness today is to protect the privilege
against self-incrimination and to insure the meaningful quality of a defendant's choice. See
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964). This policy surely applies to guilty pleas as well as to
out-of-court confessions.
In an unpublished address to the National Legal Aid and Defender Association in 1967,
Professor Anthony G. Amsterdam suggested that the distinction between guilty pleas and
confessions "lies at a human level." Professor Amsterdam noted that when a prosecutor seeks
to use a confession against a person on trial, the confession can work only to the person's
disadvantage. A strict view on the admissibility of confessions therefore cannot harm a criminal
defendant. When the propriety of a guilty plea is litigated, however, it may be very much in
the defendant's interest to have the plea ruled voluntary. If a judge were to reject a defendant's
plea solely because it had been induced by a promise of leniency, the defendant might reasonably respond, "I appreciate your Honor's concern for my state of mind, but I really want to
enter this plea."
As Professor Amsterdam would probably recognize, this argument has little to do with
the concept of voluntariness. Because defendants today are commonly threatened with severe
sentences if they exercise the right to trial, they "really want" to enter their pleas. If the
defendants were threatened with shooting or dismemberment, moreover, they would probably
be even more vigorous in contending that their guilty pleas should be held voluntary. An
argument based on what a person may want with a gun at his head knows no limit, and
Professor Amsterdam's distinction could therefore lead to the abolition of any requirement of
voluntariness in guilty-plea cases.
In addition, Professor Amsterdam seems to elevate a procedural accident into a substantive distinction. It has been customary to litigate the validity of a guilty plea as soon as it is
presented. Any coercive forces that have caused the defendant to plead guilty are still operating,
and because they are still operating, the defendant considers it in his interest to have his plea
accepted. This situation would be duplicated if a court were established to litigate the voluntariness of a confession the moment it escaped a suspect's lips. If officers who had coerced the
confession were standing by, the suspect might reasonably announce that he wanted his confession upheld.
With both guilty pleas and confessions, litigation can occur after coercive forces have
abated. When a defendant does challenge the validity of his guilty plea, he has presumably
decided that it is in his interest to have the plea rejected. At this point in time, Professor
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fortunate that the Supreme Court did not rely on these distinctions
in Brady. The relevant distinction for the Court was simply between

confessions given in the presence of an attorney and confessions given
without legal assistance.
The common-law doctrine reiterated in Bram v. United States

was not, however, qualified on its face by a requirement that a suspect
be in custody and unrepresented by counsel, nor had the rule ever
been subject to this qualification in practice. The Supreme Court's
decision in Wilson held that the rule extended to confessions before
a magistrate,'73 and other courts applied the rule to confessions obtained in the presence of counsel' and even to guilty pleas that were
the product of suggestions by retained attorneys that waiver of the
right to trial might lead to more lenient treatment by the courts.'75
Amsterdam's contention loses any force that it might have had.
Finally, from a broader perspective, Professor Amsterdam's argument seems to beg the
question. A defendant who enters a guilty plea may desire to have the plea accepted, but the
reason for his desire is usually a recognition that a more severe sentence would follow rejection
of the plea. The goal of applying the historic concept of voluntariness to guilty pleas would be
to change this reality, so that exercise of the right to trial would not be an onerous alternative.
If a defendant's punishment were not to vary with his plea-if his punishment, whatever the
method of disposition, were to be based on what treatment would best serve the correctional
purposes of the criminal law-his choice could be truly voluntary. The problem posed by
Professor Amsterdam would simply disappear. The significant question is not whether defendants should be forced to choose one horn of the dilemma rather than the other. It is whether
they should be confronted with the dilemma in the first place.
173. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896).
174. Porter v. State, 55 Ala. 95 (1876); People v. Reilly, 181 App. Div. 522, 169 N.Y.S.
119, affd, 224 N.Y. 90, 120 N.E. 113 (1918).
Of course confessions obtained in the presence of counsel have always been rare events.
Quite apart from these exceptional incidents, the early decisions indicate that Brady's qualification of the common-law rule was inconsistent with its spirit. Some courts maintained that any
promise made anywhere by anyone (presumably even a defense attorney) would render a
confession involuntary. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Knapp, 26 Mass. 505, 9 Pick. 496 (1830):
Johnson v. State, 89 Miss. 773, 42 So. 606 (1907). Other courts insisted that the promise must
proceed from a "person in authority." See I S. GREENLEAF, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 223 (16th
ed. 1899). If a promise did come from a person in authority, however, it would invalidate a
confession even when it reached a suspect, not in custody, through an intermediary. See Searles
v. Ohio, 6 Ohio C.C.R. 331 (1892). Indeed, even if the suggestion of leniency came from a
private individual, it would invalidate a confession if it were made in the presence of a person
in authority who failed to disavow it. For example, in Regina v. Laugher, 2 Carrington &
Kirwan's 225 (1846), a police constable came to the defendant's house to arrest her for stealing
five sovereigns. The defendant's husband told her that if she knew anything about the crime
she should "tell the truth." Because the husband extended this "inducement" in the presence
of the constable, the defendant's confession was held inadmissible. Accord, State v. Sherman,
35 Mont. 512, 90 P. 981 (1907) (inducement by defendant's father in presence of police officer).
The older cases seem to adopt the sensible theory that collaboration between a person in
authority and a defendant's trusted advisor may make a promise of leniency more beguiling
rather than less.
175. People v. Walker, 250 111. 427, 95 N.E. 475 (1911); State v. Nicholas, 46 Mont. 470,
128 P. 543 (1912); Jenkins v. State, 6 Okla. Crim. 516, 120 P. 298 (1912) (dictum).
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By relying on the distinction between counseled and uncounseled
confessions, the Supreme Court largely abandoned a long-standing
common-law doctrine.
A comparison of Brain and Brady indicates how insubstantial
the Court's ground of distinction was on the facts of those cases. In
Brain, the supposed promise of leniency arose when an interrogating
officer informed the defendant that another suspect had implicated
him. The officer said, "'If you had an accomplice, you should say
so, and not have the blame of this horrible crime on your own shoulders.' "I" For the Supreme Court, even this mild statement was
enough to render the defendant's confession involuntary. In Brady,
the promise was somewhat more forceful: a federal statute assured
the defendant that a guilty plea would save him from the death penalty. Nevertheless, because the defendant in Brady had the assistance
of counsel, the Supreme Court concluded that "Brady's plea, unlike
Bram's confession, was voluntary." '77 The Court surely strained at
gnats while swallowing camels.
C. The Significance of Effective Legal Assistance in Resolving
Questions of Voluntariness: A Note on the Record in Brady
Given an appropriate definition of the relevant terms, I have
agreed that it may be reasonable to equate a competently counseled
guilty plea with a knowing guilty plea. If a defendant has been fully
advised by his attorney, his guilty plea will inevitably reflect a knowing abandonment of his rights. 7 ' In Brady, however, the Supreme
Court seemed to conclude that a competently counseled guilty plea
would ordinarily be, not only a knowing plea, but a voluntary plea
as well. I believe that this second equation was unsound, and, indeed,
that the presence of counsel has little relevance to the question of
voluntariness. A guilty plea entered at gunpoint is no less involuntary
because an attorney is present to explain how the gun works.'79
176. 168 U.S. at 539. See also id. at 564-65, where the Court discussed the significance
of this "promise."
177. 397 U.S. at 755.
178. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
179. Cf. Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318 (1882), in which a defendant pleaded guilty on
the advice of a competent attorney who feared with good reason that a mob would lynch him
if he stood trial. Of course the court held the plea involuntary despite the fact that the defendant's lawyer had offered very intelligent advice.
More recent decisions also illustrate that courts do not ordinarily attach significant weight
to the presence of counsel in resolving questions of voluntariness. The plaintiff in a recent
federal civil rights action, Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1975), had been arrested for
disorderly conduct and resisting arrest, and in exchange for a dismissal of these charges, she
had signed a form releasing the arresting officers from potential civil liability. Although the
plaintiff had been represented by apparently competent counsel in the negotiations that led to
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Under today's guilty-plea system, the basic function of the defense attorney is indeed to explain "how the gun works" -something
that was illustrated by the record in Brady. The defendant in this case
was charged with kidnapping, but under the Federal Kidnapping Act
he could not have been executed merely for being a kidnapper. The
defendant could have been executed only for being a kidnapper who
exercised his right to trial before a jury.
For several months of pretrial detention, the defendant seemed
reluctant to recognize this fact. He insisted that he was innocent and
that he wanted a jury trial. After a conscientious investigation of the
facts and the law, however, the defendant's attorney concluded that
he had "never had [a case] where the defendants had tied themselves
up in a sack like they had in this one."""s The attorney informed the
defendant that he "just couldn't go to a jury . . . because it would
be almost sure conviction and possibly a death penalty."'' The attorney told the defendant that "he would be convicted beyond a shadow
of a doubt."'8 2
The defense attorney had two allies in his effort to persuade the
defendant to plead guilty. The trial judge announced from the bench
that he thought the defendant "might get the death penalty."', 3
Moreover, when the defense attorney told the judge in chambers that
he thought that a guilty plea would probably be entered at a later
date, the judge replied, "Well, I think you are very wise, because I
was certainly going to submit the death penalty to the jury."'8 4 The
attorney dutifully reported this comment to the defendant. 85
The defendant's mother may also have been influential in altering the defendant's choice of plea. She attempted to visit the
defendant in jail but found that "it wasn't visiting hours." She testified:
I went through the alley of the city jail where he was being
held and I kept yelling, "Brady. Brady." Then-then there
was somebody, some fellow up there that yelled, "Is there a
the release, the court held that a release prompted by the plaintiff's fear of imprisonment was
necessarily involuntary. It seems odd that a decision to waive a civil trial and forego a possible
monetary award should be judged by a more stringent standard of voluntariness than a decision
to waive a criminal trial and accept a jail term.
180. Appendix to the Briefs at 64, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
181. Id. at 74-75.
182. Id. at 70.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 72.
185. Id. The Supreme Court did not mention these facts. Instead it said in a footnote,
"In Brady's case there is no claim . . . that the trial judge threatened Brady with a harsher
sentence if convicted after trial in order to induce him to plead guilty." 397 U.S. at 751 n.8.
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Brady here?" So then Brady came to the window. It was
upstairs. I don't know how many floors. Brady came to the
window and he said, "Mom what are you doing? You are
going to get yourself in trouble," and I just said, "For God's
sake, plead guilty. They are going to give you the death sentence."' 6
When it became apparent that a co-defendant would probably
testify against him, the defendant agreed to plead guilty."' The defense attorney reported that he "felt very gratified when [the defendant] decided to change his plea in that we saved him from a death
penalty in my opinion.' ' 8
The defense attorney was, I think, entitled to feel gratified; he
186. Appendix to the Briefs at 38, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). For a
discussion of the use of family members to induce pleas of guilty, see Alschuler, The Defense
Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1192-94 (1975).
187. The three Justices who concurred in the result in Brady attached great significance
to the fact that the defendant's change of plea was induced by his co-defendant's action. At
the conclusion of a post-conviction hearing, a trial court found that the defendant's guilty plea
"was made ... by reason of other matters and not by reason of [the death penalty provisions
of the Federal Kidnapping Act]." 397 U.S. at 815. Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion for the
concurring Justices declared that this finding was "not clearly erroneous" and added, "Although Brady was aware that he faced a possible death sentence, there is no evidence that this
factor alone played a significant role in his decision to enter a guilty plea." Id. at 815.
An unconstitutional death penalty alone, however, could never induce a plea of guilty. If
the government had no evidence against the defendant and he knew it, the threat of death would
not be credible. It is only when the defendant fears that he may be convicted at trial that the
threat of execution may have a coercive effect. In that sense, some piece of damaging evidence
can always be seen as the motivating force behind the defendant's decision to plead guilty. It
is invariably open to a court solemnly to "find" that the defendant's plea was induced by the
strength of the case against him.
Of course a defendant might plead guilty simply because his case is hopeless, quite apart
from any thought that this action will reduce his punishment. When the defendant has been
repeatedly and forcefully assured that a guilty plea will save him from the death penalty,
however, it would require awesome mind-reading powers for a judge to conclude that the
defendant's decision would have been the same had the assurances not been offered.
A defendant ordinarily considers both the strength of the case against him and the concessions that he has been offered in deciding whether to plead guilty. If he concludes either that
the government has no case or that no concessions will follow a plea, he will probably take
whatever chance of acquittal a trial may offer. In most cases, therefore, both some sort of case
and some sort of concession are essential to induce a plea of guilty, and if either factor is absent,
the plea will not be entered. The record in Brady may establish that the prospect of the codefendant's testimony "caused" the defendant's plea, but that fact in no way diminishes the
importance of the "concurrent cause"-the threat of execution.
The concurring Justices in Brady later maintained in dissent that an out-of-court confession should be received in evidence only when it was shown "beyond a reasonable doubt" that
the defendant had "chose[n] to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will." Lego v.
Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 491 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Surely it was not shown beyond
a reasonable doubt in Brady that the defendant's plea was the product of an "unfettered exercise
of his own will."
188. Appendix to the Briefs at 66, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
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had done a capable job and may indeed have saved the defendant
from a death sentence. The defendant's principal complaint did not,
however, concern his attorney's performance; it was directed to the
fact that exercise of the right to trial might have incurred an awesome
penalty. This underlying reality was beyond the defense attorney's
control but not beyond the control of the Supreme Court.
Contrary to the Supreme Court's suggestion, the presence of the
defense attorney in Brady did not "dissipate" the "possibly coercive
impact" of this reality. Indeed, the record in Brady suggests that the
principal function of a competent attorney in the guilty-plea system
is exactly the opposite of the function suggested by the Supreme
Court. Rather than dispel the coercive impact of a promise of leniency, the attorney must make the defendant realize with full clarity
the coercive power of the alternatives that he faces. In that way, the
attorney may persuade the defendant to choose the course that,
within the confines of a cynical system, is likely to injure him least.,"5
In Brady, the Supreme Court assumed that the defendant's guilty
plea had been induced by the government's threat of a death sentence,
and words must mean very little to a Court that could describe such
a guilty plea as voluntary. As James F. Parker has written, "A more
coercive threat than the death penalty does not readily come to
mind." 9 0
D. The Court's Basic Touchstone of Involuntariness: A Threat of
Unlawful Action
The Supreme Court did indicate in Brady that guilty pleas entered with the assistance of counsel might be set aside in a few extreme situations. The Court adopted a general definition of voluntariness that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had
devised in 1957:
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct
189. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REV. 30, 155 (1970):
Though a lawyer can explain to the defendant the consequences of his choice in each
instance, he cannot remove the coercion inherent in the choice. . . . Honest appraisal of the plea bargaining process in the future will demand that the Court not
rely on the presence of counsel as a crucial factor in the determination of the voluntariness of a plea of guilty.
190. Parker, Plea Bargaining, I AM. J. CRIM. L. 187, 200 (1972). The Supreme Court
itself has recognized this point in a context somewhat different from plea bargaining. In Schick
v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974), the Court considered the historic English practice of commuting
a convicted felon's death sentence on the condition that he be transported to a colony. Chief
Justice Burger wrote for the Court, "The idea later developed that the subject's consent to
transportation was necessary, but in most cases he was simply 'agreeing' that his life should be
spared. Thus, the requirement of consent was a legal fiction at best ...
." Id. at 261.
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consequences, including the actual value of any commitments
made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel,
must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including
unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises
that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes).' 9
This standard, based on such largely undefined terms as
"threats," "improper harassment," and "promises that are by their
nature improper," could be read as entirely question-begging. If that
reading is rejected, the standard suggests that only a broken promise,
a factual misrepresentation, a threat to do something illegal if the
defendant refuses to plead guilty, or a promise to discontinue an
illegal action if he does plead guilty can make a resulting guilty plea
involuntary. This standard may therefore seem to distinguish the case
of a guilty plea entered at gunpoint from cases like Brady. 9 ' A defendant with a gun at his head is threatened with illegal action, but the
defendant in Brady could, under a properly drawn statute, have been
legally executed for his crime. In Brady, moreover, the Supreme
Court maintained that a promise of leniency is not "an illegal act as
such,"' and it asserted that there had been no "misrepresentation
or other impermissible conduct by state agents."'9 4 A number of
lower courts have invoked the Fifth Circuit standard that the Supreme Court adopted in Brady to deny relief to defendants who could
not show that they had been "subjected to threats or promises of
unlawful action."' 9 5
1. The Court's Unlawful Act Standardand Its Implicit Return
to the View that Governmental Benefits Can Automatically Be Conditioned Upon Waivers of Constitutional Rights: The Defendant
Merely Has an Option or a Privilege to Avoid Consequences that the
State Could Lawfully Inflict.
The Court's "unlawful act" standard defines a possible test of
voluntariness, but there is no magic in the definition. Any appeal that
191. 397 U.S. at 755, quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571,572 n.2 (5th Cir.
1957), rev'd per curiam on confession of error, 356 U.S. 26 (1958).
192. For a suggestion that the guilty plea in Brady should have been held involuntary
even under the Court's standard, see text accompanying note 232 infra.
193. 397 U.S. at 754.
194. Id. at 757.
195. See, e.g., Meyer v. United States, 424 F.2d 1181, 1188 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 853 (1970); Ford v. United States, 418 F.2d 855, 859 (8th Cir. 1969); Kent v. United
States, 272 F.2d 795, 799 (1st Cir. 1959); O'Neil v. United States, 315 F. Supp. 1352, 1354
(D. Minn. 1970); People v. Bowman, 40 III. 2d 116, 125, 239 N.E.2d 433, 439 (1968).
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it has seems to derive from a crude sort of a fortiori reasoning:
Because the state has a legal power to do something (for example, to
grant leniency or withhold it), the state may condition the exercise
of this power as it chooses (for example, by granting leniency only if
a defendant agrees to waive his constitutional right to trial). The
defendant is merely given an option, and because this option is less
onerous than the fate that he could legally have suffered without it,
he has no basis for complaint. The defendant can have a valid
grievance only if the state has confronted him with an alternative that
is itself beyond the state's power.' 96
For a substantial period in the history of American jurisprudence, this type of reasoning was commonplace. Judges of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, captivated by physical concepts, reasoned that a greater governmental power included all lesser
powers. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote, for example, "Even in
the law the whole generally includes its parts. If the State may prohibit, it may prohibit with the privilege of avoiding the prohibition
in a certain way."' 97 Justice Holmes therefore concluded that because
a state had no constitutional duty to provide parks for its citizens, a
citizen could have no constitutional right to speak in a park.' Similarly, because a person had no constitutional right to be a policeman,
it followed that a policeman could be discharged for expressing his
political views.'99
Today this tough-minded approach has generally yielded to the
language of unconstitutional conditions. Indeed, the view that the
government may not automatically condition the grant of a benefit
upon the waiver of a constitutional right was also dominant in the
period before the end of the nineteenth century. Although the Su196. For an illustration of where this logic can lead, see "Sentence: Ten Years of
Church," Austin American, June 4, 1972:
Orlando, Fla. (AP)-A young woman who pleaded guilty to murder has been sentenced to go to church each Sunday for the next ten years by a judge who admits he
skips religious services now and again himself. Eartha Lee Griffith, 28, appeared
before Circuit Court Judge Claude Edwards last week and was told she could decide
how to spend the next ten years of her life. "I told her she could go to jail for the
next ten years or spend every Sunday through 1982 in a pew," said Edwards. "For
the first time since I have known her, she smiled. She chose church."
197. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. I, 53 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
198. Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895) (Holmes, J.), affd,
167 U.S. 43 (1897).
199. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216,29 N.E. 517 (1892) (Holmes,
J.). Of course the blanket denial of privilege does not influence conduct or lead to a waiver of
constitutional rights, while the conditional grant of a privilege is likely to have this effect. See
O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits With Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L.
Rbv. 443 (1966).
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preme Court had at least, hinted at the right-privilege distinction as
early as 1869,200 its first articulation of the doctrine as a basis for
decision apparently came in 1894. In Ashley v. Ryan,201 the first Mr.
Justice White wrote for a unanimous Court:
As it was within the discretion of the State to withhold or
grant the privilege of exercising corporate existence, it was,
as a necessary resultant, also within its power to impose whatever conditions it might deem fit as prerequisite to corporate
life. The act of filing, constituting, as it did, a claim of a right
to the franchise granted by the state law, carried with it a
voluntary assumption of any burden with which the privilege
was accompanied ....
202
The approach of the Ashley Court was markedly different from
the approach of the Supreme Court in 1855 when it decided Lafayette
Ins. Co. v. French.20 3 The opinion of Mr. Justice Curtis in that case
recognized that a state could prevent foreign corporations from doing
intrastate business within its territory, but the opinion observed that
conditions on doing business must be "reasonable" and not "repug20 4
nant to the constitution or laws of the United States.
200. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). See also State Tax on Ry. Gross
Receipts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 284 (1872); Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 456
(1874); Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 186
(1888); Mainev. Grand Trunk Ry., 142 U.S. 217 (1891); Horn Silver Mining Co. v.New York,
143 U.S. 305, 313 (1892).
The broad statements of Mr. Justice Field in Paul and his later statements in Pembina
and Horn Silver could be read as expressing unqualified acceptance of the notion that a state
may condition the grant of a privilege as it chooses. Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Field's concurrence in Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874), indicates that this interpretation would be erroneous. The Morse case, which will be discussed in the text accompanying
notes 205-08 infra, held a state's condition on the grant of corporate privileges unconstitutional. After careful analysis, the Court concluded that the Paul opinion was consistent with
its theory of unconstitutional conditions. Indeed, all of the Field opinions took pains to demonstrate the constitutionality of the conditions that states had attached to their grants of privilege,
and statements that corporate privileges "may be granted upon such terms and conditions as
. . States may think proper to impose." Paul v. Virginia, supra at 181. Paul should be read
in this context.
201. 153 U.S. 436 (1894).
202. Id. at 441.
203. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).
204. Id. at 407. See also Ducat v. Chicago, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 410, 415 (1870). The
Court's decision in Lafayette upheld a requirement that foreign corporations consent to suit
on contracts "made and to be performed within" the state, and the limited character of the
waiver that the state demanded and its close relationship to the purposes of a grant of business
privileges plainly influenced the Court's result. In a later period, however, these limitations
became unimportant. See Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co., 243 U.S. 93,
96 (1917) (Holmes, J.) (state may require corporation to consent to suit on out-of-state contracts-"the party executing the document takes the risk of the interpretation that may be put
upon it by the courts.").
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In 1874, moreover, the Court decided Insurance Co. v. Morse,"5
and brought the issue clearly into focus. A Wisconsin statute required
insurance companies, as a condition of doing business in the state,
to waive their right to remove civil lawsuits from the state to the
federal courts. The two dissenting Justices who would have upheld the
statute declared: "A State has the right to exclude foreign insurance
companies from the transaction of business within its jurisdiction
... .The right to impose conditions upon admission follows, as a
necessary consequence, from the right to exclude altogether."' 20 6 The
majority, however, relied on Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French and held
the statute invalid. It observed, "None of the [prior] cases so much
as intimate that conditions may be imposed which are repugnant to
the Constitution and laws of the United States ... ."01 Moreover,
Mr. Justice Hunt's opinion for the majority contained language that
may suggest how the Court would have viewed the propriety of guiltyplea bargaining had the issue come before it during this period:
Every citizen is entitled to resort to all the courts of the
country, and to invoke the protection which all the laws or
all those courts may afford him. A man may not barter away
his life or his freedom, or his substantial rights.2"'
The earliest appellate decision on plea bargaining that I have
discovered relied on a theory of unconstitutional conditions to invalidate the defendant's plea. In Tennessee in 1865, a defendant pleaded
guilty to two counts of gambling. He was fined twenty-five dollars
on one count and ten dollars on the other. In accordance with an
agreement that the defendant had entered with the prosecutor, eight
other charges of gambling were dismissed. The Tennessee Supreme
Court remarked that this "statement of fact [was] unprecedented in
the judicial history of the state," and it ordered a new trial on a plea
of not guilty. The court said, "By the constitution of the state, the
accused, in all cases, has a right to a 'speedy public trial .... ' and
this right cannot be defeated by any deceit or device whatever."2' 9
205. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874).
206. Id. at 458-59 (Waite, C.J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 457.
208. Id. at 451: The Morse decision was followed in Barron v. Burnside, 121 U.S. 186,
200 (1887) ("As the Iowa statute makes the right to a permit dependent upon the surrender by
the foreign corporation of a privilege secured to it by the Constitution and law of the United
States, the statute requiring the permit must be held to be void"). Accord, Southern Pac. Co.
v. Denton, 146 U.S. 202, 207 (1892); Martin v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 151 U.S. 673, 684 (1894);

Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 111 (1898). Once the right-privilege distinction had
clearly carried the day, however, Morse was effectively overruled. See Security Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U.S. 246 (1906).
209. Swang v. State, 42 Tenn. (2 Caldwell) 212, 213-14 (1865).
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Even in the period from 1894 to 1926, many of the Supreme
Court's decisions were inconsistent with the notion that a state could
condition the grant of a privilege as it chose. 1 0 In 1926, moreover,
Mr. Justice Sutherland's opinion in Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v.
Railroad Comm'n"1 I marked a turning point. The Justice observed,
"If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as
a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender
of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of
existence." ' In more recent years, as the scope of government employment, government contracts, government subsidies, and other
governmental benefits has expanded, the Supreme Court has applied
the concept of unconstitutional conditions in a variety of contexts.' 3
Of course the problem remains difficult. Although a governmental agency may not invariably condition the grant of a benefit upon
a waiver of constitutional rights, sometimes it may do so. It is necessary to balance the sacrifice of constitutional values against the ability of the waiver to further the legitimate purposes of the grant.' 4
Nevertheless, purely "gratuitous" conditions-conditions that do not
significantly further the purpose of a governmental grant-are almost
invariably invalidated. If, for example, the federal government were
to award a contract to build aircraft to a particular manufacturer, it
could probably require, as a condition of the grant, that the manufac210. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914); Pullman Co. v.
Kansas, 216 U.S. 56, 62 (1910); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910). In Baltic
Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68, 83 (1913), the Court said, "A state may not say to
a foreign corporation, you may do business within our borders if you permit your property to
be taken without due process of law."
211. 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
212. Id. at 594.
213. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973) (government contract); Spevack
v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (bar membership); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
(unemployment compensation); Speiser v. Randell, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (tax exemption); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (government employment).
214. See Bagely v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 506, 421 P.2d 409,
415, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 407 (1966):
Not only must the conditions annexed to the enjoyment of a publicly-conferred
benefit reasonably tend to further the purposes sought by conferment of that benefit
but also the utility of imposing the conditions must manifestly outweigh any resulting
impairment of constitutional rights.
Cf Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1969)("The problem ... is to arrive at a
balance between the interest of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
service it provides through its employees."). For a more exhaustive description of considerations that may become relevant in cases in which unconstitutional conditions are alleged, see
O'Neil, supra note 199.
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turer waive a fourth-amendment privilege and that he permit federal
inspectors to enter his plant without search warrants to insure that
the terms of the contract were observed."t 5 The government probably
could not, however, require that the manufacturer permit governmental inspection of his private residence, that he agree never to criticize
American foreign policy, or that he waive his right to jury trial in
future criminal prosecutions. The Supreme Court has said, "If the
only objective of a state practice is to discourage the assertion of
constitutional rights it is 'patently unconstitutional.' "2"Thus, when
a waiver of constitutional rights furthers the legitimate purpose of a
governmental grant, the case is often difficult, but when the grant of
a governmental benefit is diverted from its legitimate purpose and is
used simply to discourage the exercise of a constitutional right, the
case is easy.
In my view, plea negotiation presents a relatively easy case of
gratuitous conditioning.217 Prosecutors were given their power to recommend leniency, and trial judges their power to grant it, so that they
could tailor criminal punishment to the crime and the offender. Both
prosecutors and judges, however, have bent this power to other
ends-notably, easing the administrative burden of heavy caseloads
and insuring conviction when the outcome at trial might be doubtful.
Of course it might be maintained that chilling the assertion of a
constitutional right is not the "only objective" of plea negotiation; the
ultimate objective is usually to keep the criminal caseload within
manageable proportions. In the same way, it might be maintained
that the object of inducing an aircraft manufacturer to permit inspection of his residence would be to facilitate crime detection, that the
object of inducing him never to criticize American foreign policy
would be to promote national unity, and that the object of inducing
him to waive his right to jury trial would be to simplify the administration of justice. In each of these situations, the assertion of a "legitimate purpose" for the government's condition would be unrelated to
the purpose of the.government's grant; a defender of the condition
would find himself arguing only that the exercise of a constitutional
215. Cf Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971)(visitation of home of welfare recipient).
216. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 33 n.20 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 631 (1969); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968).
217. See People v. Byrd, 12 Mich. App. 186, 186 N.W.2d 777, 783-84 n.9, 785, 795 n.45
(1968) (Levin, J., concurring). For other applications of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to the problem of plea bargaining, see Note, The Unconstitutionalityof Plea Bargaining,
83 HARV. L. REV. 1387, 1398-1401 (1970); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1595 (1960); Note, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REV.
144, 173-82 (1968).
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right should be discouraged because exercise of the right would be
undesirable. Similarly, when the defenders of plea negotiation articulate "legitimate purposes" for the practice, they seem to balance the
defendant's interest in having a trial against the government's interest
in not affording him a trial. The Constitution, however, precludes this
sort of balancing. The sixth amendment, by providing a right to jury
trial, settles the question whether the cost of affording jury trials

exceeds the gain."1 8
2. An Analogue in Private Contract Law to the Unlawful Act
Standard- Common-Law Duress
The view that a guilty plea is involuntary only when it is induced
by a threat of illegal action does have an antecedent in private contract law. In determining when contractual promises should be denied
enforcement on grounds of duress, common-law courts frequently
said that "where [a] party threatens nothing which he has not a legal
right to perform, there is no duress."219 The rigors of this doctrine
were mitigated, however, by other doctrines that often afforded relief

when enforcement of a promise seemed harsh. Under equitable doctrines of undue influence, for example, the type of pressure used was
immatrial 2 0 Even in cases of common-law duress, the requirement
of a threat of unlawful action was frequently honored in the breach, 2 '

218. If the people who created the right to jury trial were not fools, it is safe to assume
that they were aware of the fact that jury trials cost money. One who argues that plea bargaining is necessary to conserve resources merely seeks to reassess the framers' determination that
the price of jury trials is worth paying. Similarly, the authors of the sixth amendment were
doubtless aware that jury trials sometimes result in the imposition of "harsh" penalties and
that they sometimes result in acquittal of the guilty when the government's case is weak. The
waiver extracted by plea bargaining would seem rationally related to the legitimate purposes
of a grant of leniency only if bargained guilty pleas could truly be said to reflect "remorse."
As Professor Arthur Rosett has observed, however, "In many courts, the guilty-plea process
looks more like the purchase of a rug in a Lebanese bazaar than like the confrontation between
a man and his soul..' Rosett, The Negotiated Plea, ANNALS, Nov. 1967, at 75.
219. Hackley v. Headley, 45 Mich. 569, 576, 8 N.W. 511, 513 (1881).
220. See Dawson, Duress Through Civil Litigation, Part 1, 45 MICH. L. REv. 571, 585
(1947).
221. See, e.g., Schoellhammer v. Rometsch, 26 Ore. 394, 403, 38 P. 344, 347 (1894)
(duress defined as "intimidation" and as "anything tending to restrain [the promisor's] free and
voluntary act").
Cases involving threats to institute incompetency proceedings seem particularly instructive. Typically, a relative concluded that the promisor was squandering his estate and suggested
that, unless the promisor appointed a conservator "voluntarily," it would be necesary to file
judicial proceedings against him. Although, in these circumstances, it would not have been
unlawful for the relative simply to bring his lawsuit, courts invariably held that the relative's
threat constituted duress and rendered the resulting promise invalid. See Harris v. Flack, 289
I1l. 222, 124 N.E. 377 (1919); Gill's Trustee v.Gill, 124 S.W. 875 (Ky.App. 1910); Foote v.
De Poy, 126 Iowa 366, 373, 102 N.W. 112, 115 (1905) (duress equated with "moral compul-
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and during the twentieth century, there was a significant movement
away from this requirement."2 The historic concept of duress still
exerts an influence, however, and Professor John P. Dawson has

written:
It is [the] concentration on distinctions between legal and

illegal means which has chiefly arrested the modern development of the law of duress. No single formula has achieved so
wide a circulation in the duress cases as the statement that "It
is not duress to threaten to do what there is a legal right to

do." Certainly no other formula is anything like so misleading. Its vice lies in the half-truth it contains. For an enormous
range of conduct is included in the class of acts that there is
a "right"

23

to do (and therefore, under this formula to

threaten).,
One early departure from the common-law formula came from
a surprising source-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. In Silsbee v.
sion-the overpowering of a will"). See also Morse v. Woodworth, 155 Mass. 223, 29 N.E.

525 (1892)(one of many cases finding duress when an accused thief, threatened with criminal
prosecution, provided restitution to his alleged victim).
222. Even the relatively formalietic RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS rejected the traditional formulation:
Acts or threats cannot constitute duress unless they are wrongful . . . . But acts may

be wrongful within the meaning of this rule though they are not criminal or tortious
or in violation of a contractual duty.
492, comment g (1932). See also 13 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW
1606, 1611-15 (3d ed. 1970).
Recently, courts impatient with the limitations of common-law doctrine have substituted
an open-ended principle of "unconscionability." See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302
(1972 rev.); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
223. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253, 287
(1947). Professor Dawson noted that the class of threats that would invalidate a promise has
steadily expanded over the course of history. In Bracton's time, only a threat of death or bodily
torture was sufficient. Id. at 254. During the eighteenth century, the concept of duress was
extended to include the wrongful seizure and detention of property ("duress of goods"). Id. at
255. During the nineteenth century, courts began to condemn any "wrongful" interference with
freedom of choice, id. at. 256, and they gave increased attention to the threat of criminal
prosecution as a means of obtaining civil satisfaction. Id. at 261. Today's doctrine of "unconscionability," formulated after Professor Dawson wrote his article, has continued this expansive
trend, but in judging the threats that may be used to induce guilty pleas, courts have moved in
the opposite direction. For a brief description of the judicial treatment of guilty-pleas in AngloAmerican history, see Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole In PleaBargaining,36 U. Cm. L. REV.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §
OF CONTRACTS §§

50, 50-51 (1968). In Application of Buccheri, 6 Ariz. App. 196, 203, 431 P.2d 91, 98 (1967),
the court observed, "It is very apparent from reading the decisions in this troublesome area of
.voluntariness' that pleas of guilty are usually sustained when there have been coercive influences far greater than those which would be permitted if an ordinary contractual were at stake."
See also Tigar, Forward, Waiver of ConstitutionalRights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1970).
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24
Weber,"
a businessman accused an employee of stealing money from
him and obtained the employee's confession. The employee was unable to make restitution, however, and the businessman therefore
approached the employee's mother. She was willing to pay a portion
of the amount that her son had stolen, but she claimed that she could
not pay the entire amount. The businessman said that in that event
he would speak to the employee's father. The employee's mother
protested that her husband was mentally ill and that knowledge of
his son's wrongdoing might seriously affect his condition; she begged
the businessman not to discuss the matter with him. When the businessman persisted in his threat, the employee's mother executed an
assignment to him of her share of her father's estate.
In an opinion for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
Justice Holmes agreed that for the businessman to seek restitution
from the employee's father would not have constituted an unlawful
act. He nevertheless upheld a jury's determination that the assignment had been obtained by duress. Justice Holmes wrote, "When it
comes to the . . . question of obtaining a contract by threats, it does
not follow that, because you cannot be made to answer for the act,
you may use the threat." '25 The test of duress suggested by the Silsbee
opinion was whether one party had "creat[ed] a motive from which
the other party ought to be free." 2 ' This standard, although plainly
question-begging, marked a refreshing departure from common-law
abstraction. The law of duress does provide a precedent for those who
would make a threat of unlawful action the touchstone of involuntariness in guilty-plea cases, but the precedent does not seem auspicious.
3. Departuresfrom the Unlawful Act Standard in Other
Areas: Out-of-Court Confessions, the Law of Extortion, and NonGuilty-Plea Waivers of ConstitutionalRights
Common-law courts refused to extend the logic of the duress
cases to other important areas. One departure from this logic has
already been noted: the rule that a confession is involuntary "if made
under any threat, promise, or encouragement of any hope or
favor. 2 7 This rule, like the doctrine of duress, was concerned with
protecting the quality of individual choice, but the rule did not turn
on whether a threat or promise was of lawful or unlawful action. In
applying a more sensitive test of voluntariness to confessions than to
contractual promises, common-law courts implicitly recognized a

224.
225.
226.
227.

171 Mass. 378, 50 N.E. 555 (1898).
Id. at 381, 50 N.E. at 556.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 159-77 supra.
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major difference between the two sets of issues. Threats and promises
are, of course, the essence of bargaining in a competitive marketplace. It is not at all offensive for one businessman to tell another,
"Get those soybeans here by Friday, or my firm will never do business with your firm again." In a legal system that values the privilege
against self-incrimination, however, it is not apparent why a defendant's decision to confess or to plead guilty should not be as free as
possible. 28 If the "unlawful action" standard has proven unproductive as a means of evaluating the voluntariness of contractual agreements, it plainly holds even less promise as a test of the voluntariness
of guilty pleas.
The common law also departed from the logic of the duress cases
when, in the late eighteenth century, it made blackmail a crime.2 9 A
person ordinarily has a legal right to reveal what he knows about
another person's indiscretions or to remain silent, but he may not
condition his silence upon the second person's payment of a fee.
Although the action threatened by the blackmailer is itself within his
legal power, it is unconscionable for him to induce another to surrender his right to his property in this way.
In plea negotiation, the subject of the bargain is not the
defendant's property but something that is often more valuable, his
right to trial. If the principle that has long governed the law of
extortion is sound, the fact that a defendant may have been induced
to waive his right by something other than a threat of illegal action
need not be conclusive.
The Supreme Court has not applied an "unlawful act" standard
in evaluating the voluntariness of non-guilty-plea waivers of constitutional rights, and indeed, if the statute at issue in Brady had been
designed to exact a less complete waiver, the result of the case would
probably have been different. The statute might, for example, have
guaranteed a more lenient sentence to a defendant who agreed to
stand trial without an attorney, or who waived his right to crossexamine the witnesses against him, or who agreed not to object to the
use of illegally seized evidence, or who agreed not to challenge the
228. In Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897), the Supreme Court not only
reiterated the common-law principle that confessions must not be obtained by "direct or
implied promises, however slight," but insisted that this principle was mandated by the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. This constitutional aspect of the decision made
Brain both an anathema to Dean Wigmore and a precedent of major importance for the Warren
Court. Compare 3 J. WIGMORE, THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 823
(3d ed. 1940), with Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
229. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 372-75 (2d ed. 1969). Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE §
206.3, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954) ("The threatened harm need not be 'unlawful.' ").
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racial composition of the jury. If this statute had induced a waiver
of any one of these constitutional rights, I have little doubt that the
Supreme Court would have held the waiver invalid. 3 It therefore
seems incongruous for the Court to uphold a guilty plea that waives
all of these rights and more, on the theory that the waiver was not
induced by a threat of illegal action. The smaller the defendant's
opportunity to defend himself, the less sophisticated the Supreme
Court seems to be in evaluating the quality of his choice.
Three years after the guilty-plea trilogy, the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a term that the State of New York
inserted into its public contracts. The contracts provided that if a
contractor invoked his privilege against self-incrimination in official
inquiries concerning his dealings with the state, his existing contracts
would be cancelled and the contractor would be disabled from contracting with the state for a period of five years. The sanction threatened by this provision-a loss of public contracts-was plainly less
severe than the sanction threatened in Brady-a loss of life-and the
waiver encouraged by the contractual provision was plainly a less
complete waiver of fifth amendment rights than the act of selfconviction in Brady.
Although a threat to withhold government contracts is certainly
not a threat of unlawful action, the Supreme Court held the contract
term invalid. Mr. Justice White, who in Brady had regarded the
threat of capital punishment as merely another factor for the
defendant and his attorney to take into accoUnt, wrote for the Court,
"A waiver secured under threat of substantial economic sanction
cannot be termed voluntary." 23 ' When a court refuses to apply its
usual standards of waiver to the most pervasive waiver that our system of criminal justice permits, its application of sensitive dueprocess standards in other contexts seems hypocritical.
4. The Court's Failure to Apply Its Articulated Standard
The distinction between "legal" and "illegal" threats seems an
unsound basis for a test of voluntariness, 32 and ultimately the Su230. See, e.g., Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385
U.S. 493 (1967); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
231. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 82 (1973). Cf The Supreme Court, 1969 Term,
84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 152-53 (1970) ("The Court seems unlikely to be able to distinguish on a
principled basis those pressures inherent in plea bargaining from those pressures declared
impermissible in earlier cases.").
232. Perhaps I have already belabored the point, but there is another incongruity that
exclusive reliance on the "legality" of a threat or promise is likely to produce. In Lassiter v.
Turner, 423 F.2d 897 (4th Cir. 1970), the defendant agreed to plead guilty partly because a
prosecutor had threatened to resurrect a previously abandoned five-year-old charge unless he
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preme Court did not rely on this distinction. Rather than hold that
something less than a threat of illegal action might sometimes invalidate a guilty plea, however, the Court upheld a series of guilty pleas
that, in a sense, rested on threats of illegal action.
In McMann v. Richardson, the State of New York, by virtue
of its pre-Jackson v. Denno procedures, informed the defendants that
even if their confessions had been illegally obtained, the confessions
would be used at trial in violation of the United States Constitution.
Despite this threat of unlawful action, the Court upheld the
defendants' pleas. Similarly, although the defendant in Brady v.
United States might have been lawfully sentenced to death under a
properly drawn statute, the defendant was not charged under a properly drawn statute. He was instead threatened with a death penalty
that, under the retroactively applied decision in United States v.
Jackson, could not have been legally imposed. If a threat of unlawful
action is sufficient to render a guilty plea involuntary, the guilty plea
in Brady should also have been set aside. By sustaining the guilty
pleas in Brady and McMann, the Supreme Court abandoned the test
of voluntariness that it had apparently adopted and left the law of
voluntariness in a state of disarray.
CONCLUSION

In the guilty-plea trilogy, Justice White adhered to what one of
my colleagues, Professor Lucas A. Powe, has called the "quacking
ducks school of opinion-writing." To the unsophisticated, the issue
in a case like Brady seems simple and straightforward: a defendant
was bludgeoned into a guilty plea by the prospect that he would be
executed for standing trial. Justice White, however, sent force a fleet
of quacking ducks until this issue disappeared beneath the surface:
did so. The court of appeals concluded that the prosecutor could not,' in fact have brought the
defendant to trial on this charge; that action would have been inconsistent with the defendant's
right to a speedy trial. The court therefore decided that, although the prosecutor had acted in
good faith, he had threatened the defendant with an illegal action. On that basis, the court ruled
the defendant's guilty plea involuntary.
The Lassiter decision apparently places a higher premium on the full litigation of procedural issues than on the litigation of guilt or innocence. If a question of the defendant's identity,
a factual issue, had been compromised through plea bargaining, the court apparently would
not have perceived a significant problem. Id. at 900. Nevertheless, when the ability of the
prosecutor to resurrect a five-year-old charge, a legal issue, was compromised, the court permitted the defendant to litigate the very issue that he had compromised. When the court decided
that the defendant had been threatened with illegal action, it set the guilty plea aside. In that
way, the "illegal act" standard may seem to invert the priorities of the criminal-justice system.
See also People v. Blakley, 34 N.Y.2d 311, 313 N.E.2d 763, 357 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1974).
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Voluntariness can be determined only by examining all of the circumstances of the case; the state encourages guilty pleas in various ways
throughout the criminal process; the defendant was represented by
competent counsel throughout; he was not threatened with any illegal
action.
Supreme Court opinions deserve to be taken at face value, and
I have therefore devoted this article to exploring the guilty-plea trilogy in detail. My conclusion is that the opinions of the trilogy are
essentially hypocritical. These opinions disregard both recent and
long-standing precedent, pervert or ignore the records in the cases
before the Court, and degrade the right to trial by treating the waiver
of this right in a manner that cannot be reconciled with the Supreme
Court's treatment of other waiver problems.
I should confess in closing to some small sympathy for the Supreme Court's dilemma. To insist upon constitutional values when
these values point to a major restructuring of the criminal-justice
system would require considerable courage, and it is only through
decisions like Brady, McMann, and Parkerthat the guilty-plea system can be maintained. As our criminal courts have become more
dependent on the expedient and the unconstitutional, the Supreme
Court has felt an impulse to "lock the door and throw away the
key" 2" 3-an impulse to avoid rulings whose apparent virtue would
be adherence to constitutional principle and whose apparent vice
would be the creation of ramifications that could be foreseen only
dimly. Nevertheless, one can hope that a bolder Supreme Court
will someday tire of elaborate rationalization for a lawless regime
of criminal justice and will rule that principles of constitutional fairness extend even to guilty-plea cases.
233. Cf. United States v. Bluso, 519 F.2d 473, 474 (4th Cir. 1975) ("A guilty plea is
normally understood as a lid on a box, whatever is in it .... ").
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